The United States of America
Otto Ohlendorf, Heinz Jost, Erich Naumann, Otto Rasch
[I have not inserted hyperlinks in the text of the case everywhere where this would have been possible. The two files that are most likely to be of immediate interst are the Glossary and Bioprofiles, the latter providing brief biographical details, both files being continually updated. There are links to those files at the bottom of this `page', to which you can navigate by holding down the Ctrl key and pressing the End key. For information on the referencing of Internet sources see Chapter 4 of S D Stein Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet. Addison Wesley Longman. November 1998]
VII. EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS ON IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE CASE
A. Selections from Evidence and Arguments of
For the purpose of publication, the prosecution's case has been divided into four parts-.
1.The task of the Einsatzgruppen. The prosecution alleged that it was the primary task of the Einsatzgruppen to carry out the Hitler order calling for the extermination of Jews, Communists, gypsies, and other racial or national groups considered by the Nazis as "racially inferior" or "politically undesirable". It was further alleged that another task of these Einsatzgruppen consisted in dispatching small detachments into prisoner-of-war camps in the East for the segregation and extermination of those inmates who were politically or racially undesirable. Selections from the evidence of the prosecution on this point, consisting of contemporaneous documents and affidavits of the defendants, are set forth in pp. 119 to 140. .
2. The magnitude of the enterprise. Of the contemporaneous documents on this point appearing in pp. 141 to 197, one document reports the killing of more than 220,000 people, another of more than 130,000, still others more than 91,000 persons, 80,000 persons, and 60,000 persons, respectively, and some report the killing of smaller numbers but the document reproduced here reports upon the killing of fewer than 10,000 persons.
3. Methods of execution. It was alleged by the prosecution that mass exterminations of Jews and other undesirables were carried out mainly by shooting, and that gas vans were also used for this purpose. Selections from the prosecution's evidence on this point set forth in pp. 198 to 216 include a contemporaneous document, an affidavit of an eyewitness, the German businessman Friedrich Graebe, and affidavits of several defendants.
4. Membership in criminal organizations. In count three of the indictment, all defendants were charged with membership in organizations declared to be criminal by the International Military Tribunal, namely, of the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo, respectively. The prosecution introduced in evidence extracts from the original SS personnel files. These files showed the duration of membership,
An extract from the prosecution's brief on the scope of the declaration of criminality by the International Military Tribunal, of the Gestapo, the SS and SD, appears in pp. 216 to 221; and extracts from the testimony of the defendant Braune appear in pp. 323 to 328.
2. THE TASK
OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-307-I
LETTER FROM HEYDRICH TO THE CHIEFS OF ALL EINSATZGRUPPEN CONCERNING "THE JEWISH QUESTlON IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES", 21 SEPTEMBER 1939
Pencil note : Vol 232 f Enclosure 4
The Chief of the Security Police
To the Chiefs of all Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police
With reference to the conference which took place today in
A distinction is to be made between,
The measures planned require the most thorough preparation both from the technical and the economic point of view.
It goes without saying that the tasks in this connection cannot be laid down in detail. The following instructions and directives simultaneously serve the purpose of urging the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen to practical consideration.
The first necessity for the attaining of the final aim is the concentrating of the country Jews in the big towns. This is to be carried out immediately.
A distinction is to be made (1) between the territories of Danzig and West Prussia, Posen, Eastern Upper Silesia, and (2) the remaining occupied territories. As far as possible the territories enumerated under (1) are to be cleared of Jews, but the very least to be aimed at is the formation of very few "concentration" towns.
In the territories mentioned under (2) as few "concentration" points as possible are to be established in order to facilitate later measures. Care must be taken that only such towns be chosen as concentration points as are either railroad junctions or at least lie on a railway.
It is laid down on principle that Jewish communities of less than 500 persons are to be dissolved and to be sent to the nearest "concentration" town.
This decree does not concern the territory of Einsatzgruppe I which, lying east of Krakow, is bordered by Polanico, Jaroslav, the new demarcation line and the former Slovak-Polish frontier. Within this territory only a temporary census of Jews need be taken. The rest is to be done by the Jewish Council of Elders dealt with below.
II Jewish Council of Elders
1. In every Jewish community a Jewish Council of Elders is to be set up which, as far as possible, is to be formed from persons in authority and rabbis who have remained behind. Up to 24 male Jews (according to the size of the Jewish community) are to form the Council of Elders. It is to be made fully responsible, within the meaning of the word, for the exact and punctual
2. In the event of the sabotaging of such instructions, the strictest measures are to be announced to the council.
3. The Jewish councils are to undertake a temporary census of the Jews-if possible arranged according to sex (ages (a) up to 16 years, (b) from 16 to 20 years, and (c) over and according to the principal professions-in their localities, and to report thereon within the shortest possible period.
4. The Councils of Elders are to be advised of the days fixed and the appointed times of the evacuation, the possibilities of evacuation, and finally the evacuation routes. They are then to be made personally responsible for evacuation of the Jews from the country. The reason for the concentrating of Jews in the towns is to be that Jews have to a very great extent participated in franc-tireur attacks and pillage.
5. The Councils of Elders in the "concentration" towns are to be made responsible for the suitable accommodation of the Jews from the country. The concentration of the Jews in the towns will probably, in the interests of general security, call for certain regulations in these towns, e. g., that certain quarters of the town be altogether forbidden to the Jews; that in the interests of economic necessity, they be forbidden to leave the Ghetto, forbidden to go out after a certain hour in the evening, etc.
6. The Council of Elders is to be made responsible for the suitable feeding of the Jews during their transportation to the towns. No objections are to be made if the departing Jews take their movable possessions with them, as far as this is technically possible.
7. Jews who do not comply with the order to move to the towns are, in certain cases, to be given a short respite. They are to be advised of the most strict punishment if they do not comply with this time limit.
All necessary measures are, on principle, always to be taken in the closest agreement and cooperation with the German civil administration and the competent local military authorities.
When carrying out this action care is to be taken that the economic security of the occupied territories suffers no damage.
1. The needs of the army are to be the first consideration, e. g., it will hardly be
possible, to begin with, to avoid leaving behind Jewish traders here and there who, for
lack of other possibilities, must definitely remain behind for the provisioning of the
troops. In such cases, however, the speedy Aryanization of these industries is to be aimed
at, in agreement with the
2. It goes without saying that Jewish branches of industry and trade which are vital to the life of the community, the war effort, or the Four Year Plan must be maintained in order to safeguard economic interest in the occupied territories. In such cases, also, the quickest possible Aryanization is to be aimed at and the migration of the Jews completed.
3. Finally, the food question in the occupied territories is to be taken into consideration. For example, if possible, land belonging to Jewish settlers is to be farmed with their own by the neighboring German or Polish peasants, in an official capacity, so that the gathering in of the harvest still in the fields or the continued cultivation can be safeguarded. With regard to this important question, contact is to be made with agricultural expert consultants of the chief of civil administration.
4. In all cases where the interests of the security police on one hand and the German civil administration on the other are not in agreement, the individual measures in question are to be reported to me as quickly as possible before their execution and my decision awaited.
The chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen will report to me continually regarding the following circumstances:
1. Census of Jews in their districts (if possible in the above-mentioned groups). The numbers are to be divided into Jews who will be migrating from the country and those who are already in the towns.
2. Names of towns selected as "concentration" points.
3. The time limits set for the migration of the Jews to the towns.
4. Summary of all Jewish branches of industry and trade which are vital to the life of
the community, the war effort, or the Four Year Plan. If possible the following facts are
to be established: a. The type of undertaking (together with estimate of the possibility
of the adaptation of the undertaking to one vital to the life of the community, the war
effort, or the Four Year Plan. b. Which of these undertakings it is most urgent to
Aryanize (to avoid damage of any kind) ? How is it proposed to effect the Aryanization?
Germans or Poles (this decision is dependent on the importance of the industry). c. What
is the number of the Jews employed in these industries (among those in the influential
positions) ? Can the industry be maintained without any more ado after the evacuation of
In order to attain the aims which have been set, I expect the fullest cooperation from all forces of the security police and the security service.
The neighboring chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen must immediately get into touch with one another, in order that the territories in question may be dealt with in their entirety.
The OKH [Army High Command], the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan (for the attention of State Secretary Neumann), the Reich Ministries of the Interior (for the attention of State Secretary Stuckart), for Food and Economy (for the attention of State Secretary Landfried), as well as the chiefs of the civil administration of the occupied territories have received a draft copy of this decree.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-3414
EXTRACT FROM OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 8, 17 JULY 1941
The Chief of the Security Police and the SD
Operational Order No. 8
Subject: Directives for the Kommandos of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD which are to be detailed to the
*Oskar van Hindenburg son of the former Reich president.
While the regulations and orders of the prisoners of war system were hitherto based exclusively on considerations of a military nature, now the political goal must be attained, namely, to protect the German people from Bolshevist agitators and to gain a firm grip on the occupied territory at the earliest possible moment.
II. Means to attain the objective
B. While the rough separation pursuant to A 1 to 5 is made by the camp authorities themselves, the Reich Leader SS will make available for the segregation of the persons pursuant to A 3 and 4.
"Einsatzkommandos of the security police and security service."
They are directly subordinated to the chief of the security police and security service [SD], especially trained for their special assignment, and take their measures and make their in-vestigations within the framework of the camp regulations according to directives which they have received from the chief of the security police and the security service.
The commanders, particularly their counterintelligence officers, are duty bound to cooperate closely with the Einsatzkommandos.
III. Further treatment of the segregated groups
A. Civilians, if unsuspected, remain segregated in the camp until their repatriation to the occupied territory appears possible.
The date for it is fixed by the competent armed forces commander (respectively the commander of the army [group] rear area) after approval by the competent agencies of the chief of the security police and security service. The main condition for repatriation is that the person in question can with certainty be utilized for labor at his or her native place, or in labor units to be set up specifically.
The armed forces commander (respectively the commander of the army [group] rear area) is responsible for supplying guards during the transport. As far as possible the camp will provide an escort detachment.
As for "suspects" see II A 3.
B. Military personnel
A special order will be issued regarding the final assignment of military personnel. Already here it must be stressed that no Asiatics and persons speaking the German language are to be considered for employment in Germany.
C. As for the persons segregated as "suspects" (see II A 3) the Einsatzkommando of the security police and the security service will make further decisions.
Should some persons who were regarded as suspects later on turn out to be nonsuspects, they are to be sent back to the other civilians or soldiers in the camp.
The request of the Einsatzkommandos for the surrender of any other persons must be complied with.
D. Trustworthy persons are first to be employed for segregating suspects (II A 3) and for other tasks of the camp administration. (Special reference is made to "Volga-Germans".)
If they are particularly fit for reconstruction work in the occupied territory, a request for release made by the Einsatzkommando of the security police and security service may be denied only if there is any special interest in an individual person from a counterintelligence viewpoint.
E. Ethnic groups, e. g. Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithua-nians, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Georgians, and Volga-Germans. Separation of both soldiers and civilians, unless these are sent to the occupied territory in the near future, anyway.
As to the employment of the individual ethnic groups, a special order will be issued.
[Stamp] Top Secret
The Kommandos will be detailed in accordance with the agreement between the chief of the security police and the security service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, of 16 July 1941 (see encl. 1).
Within the framework of the camp regulations the Kommandos are operating independently by virtue of special authorization and in accordance with the general directives issued to them. It goes without saying that the Kommandos will keep closest contact with the camp commander and the counterintelligence officer attached to him.
The task of the Kommandos is the political screening of all inmates of the camp and the segregation and further treatment of-
No aids can be made available for the Kommandos in the performance of their task. The "German Register of Wanted Persons", the "list compiled by the Office for the Investigation of Domiciles", and the "Special Register of Wanted Persons, U. S. S. R." will be of very little use in most cases; the "Special Register of Wanted Persons, U. S. S. R." is not sufficient because only a small proportion of the Soviet Russians classified as dangerous are listed therein.
The Kommandos, therefore, will have to rely on their own specialized knowledge and ability, on their own clues and self-acquired experiences. For this reason they will not be able to start on their task until they have accumulated sufficient material.
For the time being and also later on, the Kommandos in performing their tasks will utilize to the fullest possible extent the experience which the camp commanders have accumulated from observation of the prisoners and from interrogation of camp inmates.
Furthermore, the Kommandos must endeavor right at the start to single out those elements among the prisoners which appear to be reliable, regardless of whether or not they are Communists,
It must be possible through the employment of these confidential agents and by making use of any other means available to single out, as a first step, all those elements among the prisoners which are to be segregated. By a short interrogation of the singled-out persons and, possibly, by questioning other prisoners, the Kommandos will be in a position to take the final decision in each individual case.
The statement of one confidential agent is as such not sufficient proof to class a camp inmate as suspicious. Somehow or other, a confirmation should be obtained if possible.
Above all, it is necessary to find out all important officials of the state and the Party, in particular-
As already mentioned, it is no less important to sort out those persons who may be used for the reconstruction, the administration, and economic management of the conquered Russian territories.
Finally, it will be necessary to sort out those persons who will yet be wanted for the conclusion of further investigations, no matter whether of a political nature or otherwise, and for the clarification of questions of general interest. This category includes in particular all higher state and Party officials who are able to give information regarding the measures and working methods of the Soviet-Russian state, the Communist Party or the Comintern, owing to their position and their knowledge.
Finally when making any decisions the racial origin has to be taken into consideration.
The leader of the Einsatzkommando will transmit a weekly brief report to the Reich Security Main Office by teletype or express [special delivery] letter. This report will contain-
On the strength of these operational reports the Reich Security Main Office will communicate further measures to be taken at the earliest possible moment.
In order to carry out successively the measures indicated in these instructions, the Kommandos will request the camp authorities to surrender the prisoners in question.
Camp authorities have been instructed by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces to comply with such requests (see encl. 1).
Executions must not be carried out in or near the camp. If the camps are in the General Government close to the frontier, prisoners are to be moved to former Soviet territory, if possible, for special treatment.
In the event of executions being necessary for reasons of camp discipline, the leader of the Einsatzkommando has to get in touch with the camp commander for this purpose.
The Kommandos are required to keep records of the completed special treatments. These records must contain serial numbers, surnames and first names, date and place of birth, military rank, trade or profession, last place of residence, reason for the special treatment, and date and place of the special treatment (sheaves of files).
As regards the carrying out of the executions, the removal of reliable civilians and the eventual drafting of confidential agents into the occupied territories to be employed by the Einsatzgruppen, the leader of the Einsatzkommando will get in touch with the leader of the nearest local Gestapo headquarters or with the commander of the security police and the security service and, via the latter, with the chief of the Einsatzgruppe in question in the occupied territories.
As a matter of principle, such communications must be transmitted to the Reich Security Main Office IV A 1 for information. Exemplary conduct on and off duty, smoothest possible co-
operation with the camp commandant, careful scrutiny is enjoined on the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos and all members.
The members of the Einsatzkommandos have at all times to bear in mind the special importance of the tasks set them.
[stamp] Top Secret
The officer's camps are at present used as Stalags.
The transit camps are, according to the communication by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in the zone of operations and are from time to time moved nearer to the front as locally required. Their present location may be found by inquiry at the Quartermaster General, Department Prisoners of War-tele-phone: Anna 757 (military line)-Captain Sohn.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 710-PS
LETTER FROM GOERING
TO HEYDRICH CONCERNING
The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at-through furtherance of emigration and evacuation-a solution of the Jewish problem, as advantageously as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.
Whenever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to cooperate with you.
I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an over-all plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired solution of the Jewish question.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2856
I, Otto Ohlendorf, swear, depose, and state-
1. I was Chief of Einsatzgruppe D from the time of its formation in June 1941 until June 1942. The areas detailed to me for the purpose of special tasks included parts of Bessarabia and also the region to the south, and including the following cities: Chernovitsy, Mogilev-Podolski, Yampol, Ananev, Berezovka, Nikolaev, Melitopol, Mariupol, Rostov on the Don, and also the peninsula of the Crimea. Some of the plates within the area detailed to me were Odessa, Kherson, Simferopol, and also the racial German regions in the Landau and Speyer area. I can no longer remember other names which outline more sharply the area detailed to me.
2. The staff of Einsatzgruppe D consisted of only a few persons. The former Standartenfuehrer Willy Seibert was my Chief III [Leiter III]. Since he was the senior officer from point of service after me, he was entrusted by me with the duties of a deputy
*Defendant Ohlendorf testified in Court with respect to his affidavit on 9 October 1947 (Tr. p. 573)
[Page 134-135 omitted/early career]
[I] was transferred to Berlin to the RSHA Geheimes Staatspohzeiamt [Gestapo Headquarters] and became group chief for education and training at office I. At the same time, I was commissioned to take care of official matters pertaining to, and on behalf of, the Commandant of the Fuehrer school of the Security Police in Berlin-Charlottenburg. In February 1943 I was appointed chief of office I, when my predecessor Streckenbach was called to the Waffen SS. With effect from 1 May 1944 I became Commander of the Security Police in Salzburg, and kept this position until the end of the war. Approximately three weeks before the end of the war I was appointed SS and Police Leader for the Gau Salzburg, by Kaltenbrunner.
2. I became a member of the NSDAP on 1 May 1933. My Party membership number is 2902238. I became a member of the SS on 20 April 1935. My SS membership number is 170484.
3. When I was Commander of the Fuehrer school of the Security Police in Berlin-Charlottenburg and chief of group IB at the RSHA, I received, in May 1941, an order by either Streckenbach or Heydrich to keep the current class under training available for mobilization. Approximately at the same time, I was instructed to take over the leadership of the Einsatzkommando 5, which at that period was activated in Pretzsch. The Einsatzkommando 5 was a part of Einsatzgruppe C. The current class, trained at the Fuehrer school, was ordered to Pretzsch in order to be later divided up and assigned to the individual Einsatzkommandos. I myself was in Pretzsch only temporarily, as, at this time, I was engaged with my personal move from Hamburg to Berlin and aIso with official matters pertaining to the RSHA. It was approximately during the first ten days in June 1941 that the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and leaders of the Kommandos were called to the RSHA, Prinz Albrecht Palace, in order to hear a speech by Heydrich, in which he outlined the policy to be adopted and gave us some outlines concerning the carrying out of the tasks imposed upon the Einsatzgruppen.
4. On or about 23 June 1941, the Einsatzgruppe C, consisting of Sonderkommandos 4a and 4b, and the Einsatzkommandos 5 and 6 started to march in the direction of Gleiwitz. In the beginning of July, I cannot remember the exact date, we marched into Lvov. It became known there that a number of persons from Lvov had been killed before the retreat of the Russian troops. Shortly after our arrival in Lvov, Dr. Rasch, Chief of the Einsatzgruppe C, informed us that Jewish officials and inhabitants of Lvov had participated in these killings. A military command post within the city had already created a local militia. Dr. Rasch who was working in closest cooperation with the militia, had in-
structed Kommando 4b and after their departure, Kommando 6, to support the militia. Participants and suspected persons were arrested on the same or following day. In addition, the Kommando Schoengarth (BdS Krakow) was put into action.
5. After the completion of these arrests approximately 2,500 to 3,000 people had been collected in the stadium which was situated right next to the quarters of the Einsatzgruppe C. Among those arrested, there were, so I was told, also non-Jews who had been suspected of having participated in the murders. On the folIowing day we were informed by Dr. Rasch, that a Fuehrer order had come into force according to which guilty persons or even strongly suspected persons were to be shot as reprisals for these murders. As far as I remember, the OKW order that all political officials and Soviet-Russian commissars, if one could lay hands on them, were to be shot, was also published at that time. Approximately 4 days after our arrival, the executions of the persons arrested were started. Dr. Rasch was supervising these executions which were carried out by Einsatzkommando 6, under Standartenfuehrer Kroeger (Dr.). I myself saw Dr. Rasch on the field where the executions were being carried out, and Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Hoffmann, chief of staff of Dr. Rasch, also confirmed the fact that Dr. Rasch was present at the executions.
6. When I returned to my unit, Einsatzkommando 5, at midday of the same day, I was told by one of my leaders that Dr. Rasch had given orders that Kommando 5 was to take over the carrying out of the executions for that afternoon. I immediately tried to get in touch with Dr. Rasch, but only succeeded in speaking to his chief of staff, Dr. Hoffmann, who confirmed the order. I was going to try and rescind the order as far as my Kommando was concerned, I did not, however, succeed. I repeated the order in front of my leaders and the troops and gave instructions that the executions were to be carried out in a serious and dignified manner. Useless tortures were to be avoided. I personally ascertained that the physician of the Einsatzgruppe C, Dr. Kroeger (a brother of the leader of the Einsatzkommando 6), was present during the executions. I was convinced that I had done all in my power to carry out the executions in a military and humane way. My Kommando shot approximately 90 to 110 people.
I had subdivided my Kommando into three platoons; each platoon consisted of about 50 men. The persons to be executed were transported by trucks to the place of execution. At each time there were about 18 to 22 persons. I no longer remember the exact number in the trucks. The first platoon was placed face to face with the persons about to be executed, and about three men each aimed at each person to be shot. I myself was present at the
first volley of the execution, with my face turned away. When the first volley had been fired, I turned around and saw that all persons were lying on the ground. I then left the place of execution and approached the place where the second and third platoons were gathered. The first platoon which had carried out the shootings was recalled, I inspected the men, and then returned to my quarters. I noticed there that the detainees who were in the stadium next to the quarters, some of whom were still to be executed, were driven across the stadium by members of the armed forces and tortured. I did not succeed in apprehending those responsible for the tortures. In order to terminate this spectacle, I had the rear door of the stadium opened and the detainees could march out through it. The members of the armed forces who had participated in this affair disappeared as well. As the remainder of the persons to be executed had also escaped, I informed my Kommando by means of a driver that the executions were terminated.
7. About 6 or 7 days after the executions we started to march towards Dubno. On or about 14 July we marched further towards Zhitomir, which we could not reach, however. On or about 25 July we arrived in Berdichev. In the beginning of August, I, together with the other leaders of the Kommandos, was ordered to Zhitomir, where the staff of Dr. Rasch was quartered. Rasch informed us that Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln had been to see him and had transmitted an order by the Reich Leader SS, implying that all Jews were to be shot. Only in cases where Jews were required for purposes of labor, consideration as to their executions should be given. Jewish women and children were, if necessary, to be shot as well, in order to prevent acts of revenge.
8. As I did not favor this kind of warfare, I tried, evading official channels, to get in touch with Streckenbach and Heydrich directly, which I succeeded in doing at the end of August. I managed to be recalled as leader of the Einsatzkommando 6. On or about 26 September my successor, Obersturmbannfuehrer Meier, arrived at the headquarters of the Kommando in Skvira ; I handed over the leadership of the Kommando to him and returned to Berlin.
I have read the above statement consisting of seven (7) pages written in the German language and declare that it is true, according to the best of my belief and knowledge. I had the opportunity to make amendments and corrections in the above statement. I made this declaration voluntarily without promises of reward and was neither threatened nor coerced to do so.
Nuernberg, 26 May 1947
[Page 139-and part of 146 omitted]
Faculty of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences