The United States of America
Otto Ohlendorf, Heinz Jost, Erich Naumann, Otto Rasch
[I have not inserted hyperlinks in the text of the case everywhere where this would have been possible. The two files that are most likely to be of immediate interst are the Glossary and Bioprofiles, the latter providing brief biographical details, both files being continually updated. There are links to those files at the bottom of this `page', to which you can navigate by holding down the Ctrl key and pressing the End key. For information on the referencing of Internet sources see Chapter 4 of S D Stein Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet. Addison Wesley Longman. November 1998]
Page 146 [continued]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-3140
EXTRACTS FROM OPERATIONAL SITUATION
The Chief of the Security Police and the SD
Berlin, 7 October 1941
[rubber stamp] Top Secret
Operational Situation Report U. S. S. R. NO. 106
I. Political Survey
II. Report of the Einsatzgruppen and Kommundos
March and Assignment
Public Feeling and General Attitude of the Population
A Vorkommando of the Sonderkommsndo 4a led by SS 1st Lieutenants [Obersturmfuehrer] Haefner and Janssen, 50 men strong, arrived on 19 September 1941 with the fighting troop in Kiev. The Haupt [Main] Kommando of the Sonderkommando 4a reached Kiev on 25 September 1941 after SS Colonel [Standarten-fuehrer] Blobel had already been in Kiev on 21 and 22 September. The Vorkommando of the group staff, Captain of the Police Krumme, SS 1st Lieutenants [Obersturmfuehrer] Dr. Krieger and Breun and SS Sergeant [Oberscharfuehrer] Braun arrived in Kiev on 21 September 1941. The group staff followed on 25 September 1941.
The Wehrmacht first of all systematically secured public buildings, factories, and stocks of the scarcest goods, so that no large scale plunder occurred either by members of the Wehrmacht or by the population. Reports on mines and other explosive material in public buildings and apartment houses were made by the population in great numbers from the very first day of the occupation of Kiev. On 20 September 1941 a delayed action mine exploded in the citadel where an artillery staff was quartered. Among others, General of the Artillery von Seydlitz was killed by this.* On 24 September 1941 an explosion occurred in the offices of the German Rear Area Military Headquarters which developed during the day into a large fire, particularly through the lack of water. A large part of the city center and several large buildings in the suburbs were destroyed by further explosions and resulting fires. In order to control the fire, the Wehrmacht was forced to blow up more buildings to prevent the fire from spreading to other districts respectively buildings. As a result of these necessary explosions, the offices of the group staff and of the Sonderkommando 4a had to be evacuated among others. The ofice building of the group staff (formerly a castle, later a boarding school for girls and for several years, office building of the NKVD [Political National Commissariat for Internal Affairs]) suffered considerably by the necessary explosions. The clearing away of the rubble and repair work will require some time.
In the office building of the group staff, the Vorkommando found in an intensive search of the office rooms approximately 75
*Apparently a case of mistaken identity. General von Seydlits-Kurzbsach was captured by the Russians at Stalingrad, February 1943. He subsequently became vice chariman of the "Free German" National Committee and chairman of the Union of German officers.
so-called "Molotov cocktails" (explosives) and rendered them harmless. In another case, the search group of the armed forces found about 70 centner [7,716 pounds] of explosives in the Lenin Museum which were to be detonated by a short wave transmitter. Meanwhile the responsible authorities succeeded in limiting the large fire to the district where it had occurred, and also in controlling it. According to testimony from parts of the population, there exists in Kiev a Red sabotage battalion as well as numerous members of the NKVD and of the Communist Party, which have orders to commit continuous acts of sabotage. In the last days there occurred no more acts of sabotage, like explosions or fires. Extensive counter-measures for this purpose were successfully taken.
As a result of the destruction of buildings in particular and of the evacuation of the endangered districts ordered by the authorities, approximately 25,000 persons were deprived of shelter and had to spend the first few days of the occupation outdoors. The inconveniences resulting from this were accepted by the population with calm. No serious incidents or panic occurred. Meanwhile the evacuated apartments, as far as they were not destroyed by fires or explosions, have again been put at the disposal of the population. Besides an adequate number of apartments has been evacuated through the liquidation of approximately 35,000 Jews on 29 and 30 September 1941, so that now shelter for the homeless is secured and has meanwhile also been allocated.
Executions and Other Measures
Partly because of the better economic situation of the Jews under the Bolshevist regime and their activities as informers and agents of the NKVD, partly because of the explosions and the resulting fires, the public feeling against the Jews was very strong. As an added factor it was proved that the Jews participated in the arson. The population expected adequate retaliatory measures by the German authorities. Consequently all Jews of Kiev were requested, in agreement with the city commander, to appear on Monday, 29 September by 8 o'clock at a designated place. These announcements were posted by members of the Ukrainian militia in the entire city. Simultaneously it was announced orally that all Jews were to be moved. In collaboration with the group [Gruppen] staff and 2 Kommandos of the police regiment South, the Sonderkommando 4a executed on 29 and 30 September, 33,771 Jews. Money, valuables, underwear and clothing were secured and placed
partly at the disposal of the NSV INazi Party Public Welfare Organizationl for use of
the racial Germans, partly given to the city administration authorities for use of the
needy population. The transaction was carried out without friction. No incidents occurred.
The "Resettlement measure" against the Jews was approved throughout by the
population. The fact that in reality the Jews were liquidated was hardly known until now,
Simultaneously a number of NKVD officials, political commissars, and partisan leaders was arrested and liquidated.
The Bandera* men had lost their impact through the arrests before Kiev effected by the Kommandos and their activity was reduced to the mere distribution of leaflets and the posting of placards. Three arrests were effected, further arrests are planned.
Communications with the local authorities were immediately established by the group staff as well as the Sonderkommando 4a and the Einsatzkommando 5 also stationed in Kiev. A constant cooperation with these authorities was accomplished and the actual problems were discussed in daily consultations.
On the activity of the Einsatzkommando must be reported in detail in separate action reports, because of the great extent of the material.
*Ukraininan independence movement, named after its leader
[The remainder of Page 149, and Pages 150-178 have been omitted]
[Report on activities of Einsatzgruppe C, Location Simferopol]
"Atmosphere" and Situation in Kiev
In the course of the systematic mopping-up operations and the complete rounding-up of all Jews and Communists in the neighborhood of Kiev, the Sonderkommando 4a dispatched a number of Teilkommandos who were able to complete their tasks without any difficulties and in cooperation with the competent local commanders of the German Wehrmacht. Thus, on 22 October 1941 at Koselets apart from 11 Communists and partisans which had been handed over by the Wehrmacht, 125 Jews were executed, who were the rest of a population which, before the war, had numbered over 2,000. On this occasion the Ukrainian militia, recruited at Koselets, made itself useful in the rounding-up and by procuring the necessary manpower for making the pits.
On 23 October 1941 a Teilkommando of Sonderkommando 4a visited the town Chernigov which, before the war, had a popuIation of 70,900, of which only 40,000 remain today. Of more than 10,000 Jews not more than 260 have stayed behind. The town itself was a sight of almost complete destruction, and it is said that the inner part was set on fire by the Jews before the German troops entered the town. Apart from 8 Communists and partisans who again were handed over by the local commander of the Wehrmacht, the Kommando shot 116 Jews on 23 October 1941 and 144 on the following day. When the same Kommando again passed Chemigov on 23 October 1941, 49 Jews could be arrested
In Oster, on 29 October 1941, 215 Jews, partisans as well as a few functionaries of the Communist Party, were arrested and executed. The attempt of Sonderkommando 4a to take action against Nezhin, where approximately 325 Jews are living, failed three times since it was impossible to reach this place on roads which were covered with mud after the rain and thus impassable for motor vehicles.
For the same reason the plan of Sonderkommando 4a, to have a stronger unit follow the Vorkommando already sent to Kharkov, had to be deferred for the time being. In the course of the investigations made in Kiev in connection with the winding-up of the illegal party machinery of the Communist Party, further arrests could be made by Sonderkommando 4a. The arrest of the Ukrainian Michael Tschemisch, a member of the secret Kyrov-Rayon-Party-Committee, led to the finding and seizing of approximately 50 kilos of leaflets and propaganda pamphlets, which were intended for the illegal activities of the Communist Party in the Ukraine.
From 11 until 24 October 1941Sonderkommando 4b carried out 205 executions. These were 11 political functionaries, 13 saboteurs and looters, and 181 Jews.
During the time from 25 October till 30 October 1941 Sonder-kommando 4b executed 7 political functionaries, 2 saboteurs and looters, and 381 Jews.
According to a report of Sonderkommando 4b there is a mental asylum at Poltava with 865 inmates; attached to it is a farm of 1,200 morgen, the produce of which is used to feed the insane and the staff living there. In view of the extremely critical food situation in Poltava-for instance there is no full-cream milk to be had for the three large military hospitals--the commander of Sonderkommando 4b, in agreement with the 6th Army and the local commander of the Wehrmacht, contacted the woman doctor in charge of the asylum with the object of reaching an agreement on the execution of at least part of the insane.
The woman doctor in charge quite understood that the problem should be solved in this
manner, but objected that the measure would cause unrest among the population which ought
not to be disregarded, especially since the Soviets-naturally for propaganda reason-had
given all conceivable assistance to this asylum. A way out of this difllculty was found by
deciding that the execu-
Since 5 October 1941, Einsatzkommando 6 is busy in the district of the Dnepr bend.
Apart from extensive rural districts the following towns, all of a definitely industrial
character and densely populated, were dealt with : Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk
(150,000 inhabitants), Verchnedneprovsk (30,000 inhabitants), Novo Moskovsk (30,000
inhabitants), Zaporozhe (350,000 inhabi-tants) and Nikopol (60,000 inhabitants). In the
area of Einsatzkommando 6 the total number of town dwellers is around 1.2 million, not
including those of smaller places. Naturally the amount of work to be accomplished is
proportionately high and can hardly be accomplished with the forces available. Apart from
the cases which are really of interest to the security police there is the work,
unfortunately unavoidable, to be done in connection
During the time covered by the report, Einsatzkommando 6 was able to find out about a number of functionaries, however, again and again it appeared that here too the most active people had escaped in time. After a long search an NKVD murderer of the worst kind could be arrested on 26 October. Lately, partisans and saboteurs have caused the Einsatzkommando 6 more trouble than formerly. Five different depots of arms, including two of some extent, could be discovered and destroyed. On a large-scale operation, which took place on 22 October 1941, against partisans in a forest district on the other side of the Dnepr ended with the arrest of 9 partisans, some of whom were armed and others had buried their weapons. The execution by shooting of these partisans contributed considerably to pacify this district.
On 24 October 1941 a similar action was carried through by the Einsatzkommando 6 in cooperation with the military police, in a large forest district, the result of this was only the discovery of some arms and other supplies of the partisans.
Of approximately 100,000 Jews originally living in Dnepro-petrovsk about 70,000 escaped before the German troops entered the town. Of the remaining 50,000 approximately 10,000 were shot on 13 October 1941 by a detachment of the higher SS and police leader.
Up to the day of report a further 1,000 Jews were shot by Einsatzkommando 6; in view of the lack of skilled workers, it was in this connection impossible to avoid sparing, for the time being, the lives of Jewish partisans, who were urgently needed for repair work, etc. Steps are being taken for the extermination of 1,500 inmates of the provincial lunatic asylum.
Finally it is desired to pass on a report of the commander of Einsatzkommando 6, according to which the behavior of Italian and Hungarian troops has often caused annoyance to the German authorities. It was noticed for instance that Italians and Hungarians had abundant supplies of German cigarettes which they sold at exhorbitant prices to our soldiers. For instance Italians selling them in the street are demanding 2 RM for 6 cigarettes.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3257-PS*
The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested shortly after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months later, specially detached formations of the police executed a planned shooting of Jews. This action as a rule proceeded from east to west. It was done entirely in public with the use of the Ukrainian militia and unfortunately in many instances also with members of the armed forces taking part voluntarily. The way these actions which included men and old men, women, and children of all ages were carried out was horrible. The great masses executed make this action more gigantic than any similar measure taken so far in the Soviet Union. So far about 150,000 to 200,000 Jews may have been executed in the part of the Ukraine belonging to the Reich Commissariat (RK); no consideration was given to the interests of economy.
Summarizing, it can be said that the kind of solution of the Jewish problem applied in the Ukraine which obviously was based on the ideological theories as a matter of principle had the following results:
Scooping off the agricultural surplus in the Ukraine for the purpose of feeding the Reich is, therefore, only feasible if traffic in the interior of the Ukraine is diminished to a minimum. The attempt will be made to achieve this-
[The remainder of page 183,and pages 184-190 omitted]
SECRET MEMORANDUM FROM KUBE, GENERAL
The General Commissioner for White Ruthenia Department Gauleiter/ G.-507/ 42 Secret
[Handwritten] II Administration
In every encounter with partisans in White Ruthenia, it has been established that in the former Soviet part of the district general as well as in the former Polish part the Jews together with the Polish Resistance Movement in the East and the Red Army men of Moscow are the mainstay of the partisan movement. As a result of this, and in view of the danger to the whole economy, the treatment of the Jews in White Ruthenia is a predominantly political matter which, therefore, should not be solved according to economic but political angles. During detailed consultations with the SS Brigadefuehrer Zenner and the extremely capable Chief of the SD, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. jur. Strauch, we found that we had liquidated approximately 55,000 Jews in White Ruthenia during the last 10 weeks. In the Minsk-Land area, the Jewry was completely exterminated, without endangering the allocation of labor in any way. In the prevailing Polish Licla area, 16,000 Jews, in Slonim 8,000 Jews, etc., were liquidated. The preparations for the liquidation of the Jews in the Glebokie area were completely disrupted by the arbitrary action by the rear army area, which has already been reported to your office. In the rear army area-I was not contacted-10,000 Jews were liquidated who were scheduled for extermination by us anyway. In the city of Minsk about 10,000 Jews were liquidated on 28 and 29 July, 6,500 of whom were Russian Jews-mainly old people, women, and children-the remainder consisted of Jews unfit for work, most of whom had been sent to Minsk from Vienna, Brno, Bremen, and Berlin in November of the previous year at the Fuehrer's orders.
The Slutsk area was also ridded of several thousand Jews. The same applies to Novogrudok and Vileika. Radical measures still remain to be taken for Baranovichi and Hanzevichi. In Baranovichi, about 10,000 Jews are still living in the town alone, 9,000 of whom will be liquidated next month. In the town of Minsk, 2,600 Jews from Germany have been left over. Besides, all the 6,000 Jews and Jewesses are still alive who have been working, during the action, with the units who had employed them previously. Even in the future the largest Jewish labor force will be in Minsk, since the centralization of armament industries and the burden on the railways makes this necessary for the time being. In all other areas the number of Jews utilized for labor by the SD and myself will be fixed at 800 at the outside but at 500 if possible so that after the completion of the action 8,600 Jews will remain in Minsk and approximately 7,000 in the
I should therefore be grateful if the Reich Commissioner could see his way to stop further Jewish transports until the partisan threat has finally been overcome. I must make 100 per-cent use of the SD against partisans and against the Polish Resistance Movement, both of which demand the use of the full strength of the SD units, which are none too strong as it is. After the conclusion of the anti-Jewish action in Minsk, Dr. Strauch, SS Lieutenant Colonel, reported to me tonight, with justifiable wrath, that without any order from the Reich Leader SS and without notification of the commissioner, a transport of 1,000 Jews has suddenly arrived from Warsaw for use in this air fleet area.
I should like to ask the Reich Commissioner (who has already been advised by teletype), in his capacity as the highest authority in the Ostland, to stop such transports. The Polish Jew is, exactly like the Russian Jew, an enemy of all that is German. He represents a politically dangerous factor, the political danger of which exceeds by far his value as a specialized worker. Under no conditions must Wehrmacht agencies of the army or the Luftwaffe, be allowed to import, without the approval of the Reich Commissioner, into an area under civil administration, Jews from the General Government who might endanger the entire political work and security of the district general. I am in full agreement with the commander of the SD in White Ruthenia, that we are to liquidate every Jewish transport which has not been ordered or announced by our superior officers, so as to avoid further unrest in White Ruthenia.
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
[Deposition of Hermann Fredrich Graebe]
At Wiesbaden, on 10 November 1945, I made two statements describing as an eye-witness the execution of Jews on the former airport near Dubno, Ukraine, and the herding together, ill-treatment and killing of men, women, and children of the former ghetto at Rovno, Ukraine.
By way of corollary to these statements I depose as follows:
(1) The SS-man acting as the executioner on the edge of the pit during the shooting of Jewish men, women, and children on the airport near Dubno wore an SS uniform with a grey armband about 3 cm. wide on the lower part of his sleeve with the letters "SD" in black on it, woven in or embroidered.
(2) SS Major Dr. Puetz was in charge of the carrying out of the operation at Rovno during the night of 13 July 1942. I knew Dr. Puetz personally as the "Kommandeur der SP u. SD" (Commander of the Security Police and Security Service) of Rovno, for I had had several discussions with him with a view to preventing a pogrom against the Jews at Sdolbunov, Mysoch, and Ostrog. Dr. Puetz was introduced to me by the Area Commissioner Georg Marschall. In addition I definitely remember that a nameplate was fixed on the outside of the door to his office bearing his name and rank.
On the morning of 14 July I recognized three or four SS-men in the ghetto, whom I knew personally and who were all members of the security service in Rovno. These persons also wore the . armband mentioned above. I cannot recall their names, but in my opinion, the foreman Fritz Einsporn must know their names as, to my knowledge, he corresponded with them.
I made the foregoing statement in Wiesbaden, Germany, on 13 November 1945. I swear before God, that this is the absolute truth.
[Signed] Fr. Graebe
I, Hermann Friedrich Graebe, declare under oath-
From September 1941 until January 1944 I was manager and engineer-in-charge of a branch office in Sdolbunov, Ukraine, of the Solingen building firm of Josef Jung. In this capacity it was my job to visit the building sites of the firm. The firm had, among others, a site in Rovno, Ukraine.
During the night of 13 July 1942, all inhabitants of the Rovno Ghetto, where there were still about 5,000 Jews, were liquidated.
I would describe the circumstances of my being a witness of the dissolution of the ghetto, and the carrying out of the pogrom [Aktion] during the night and the morning, as follows:
I employed for the firm, in Rovno, in addition to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians about
100 Jews from Sdolbunov, Ostrog, and My-
On Saturday, 11 July 1942, my foreman, Fritz Einsporn, told me of a rumor that on Monday all Jews in Rovno were to be liquidated. Although the vast majority of the Jews employed by my firm in Rovno were not natives of this town, I still feared that they might be included in this pogrom which had been reported. I therefore ordered Einsporn at noon of the same day to march all the Jews employed by us-men as well as women-in the direction of Sdolbunov, about 12 km. from Rovno. This was done.
The Jewish Council of Elders had learned of the departure of the Jewish workers of my firm. The Council went to see the commanding officer of the Rovno Security Police and SD, SS Major [SS Sturmbannfuehrer] Dr. Puetz as early as the Saturday afternoon to find out whether the rumor of a forthcoming Jewish pogrom-which had gained further credence by reason of the departure of Jews of my firm-was true. Dr. Puetz dismissed the rumor as a clumsy lie, and for the rest had the Polish personnel of my firm in Rovno arrested. Einsporn avoided arrest by escaping from Sdolbunov. When I learned of this incident I gave orders that all Jews who had left Rovno were to report back to work in Rovno on Monday, 13 July 1942. On Monday morning I myself went to see the commanding officer, Dr. Puetz, in order to learn, for one thing, the truth about the rumored Jewish pogrom and secondly to obtain information on the arrest of the Polish office personnel. SS Major Puetz stated to me that no pogrom whatever was planned. Moreover such a pogrom would be stupid because the firms and the Reichbahn [Reich (state) Railroad] would lose valuable workers.
An hour later I received a summons to appear before the area commissioner of Rovno. His deputy, Stabsleiter and Cadet Officer [Ordensjunker] Beck, subjected me to the same questioning as I had undergone at the SD. My explanation that I had sent the Jews home for urgent delousing appeared plausible to him. He then told me-making me promise to keep it a secret that a pogrom would in fact take place on the evening of Monday, 13 July 1942. After lengthy negotiation I managed to persuade him to give me permission to take my Jewish workers to Sdolbunov-but only after the pogrom had been carried out. During the night it would be up to me to protect the house in the ghetto against the entry of Ukrainian militia and SS. As confirmation of the discussion he gave me a document, which stated that the Jewish employees of the Jung firm were not affected by the pogrom.
On the evening of this day I drove to Rovno and posted myself with Fritz Einsporn in
front of the houses in the Bahnhofstrasse
On my return I was able to prevent further Jews from being taken out. I
went to the collecting point to save these 7 men. I saw dozens of corpses of all ages and
both sexes in the streets I had to walk along. The doors of the houses stood open, windows
were smashed. Pieces of clothing, shoes, stockings, jackets, caps, hats, coats, etc., were
Several days after 13 July 1942, the area commissioner of Sdolbunov, Georg Marschall, called a meeting of all firm managers, railroad superintendents, and leaders of the Organization Todt and informed them that the firms, etc., should prepare themselves for the "resettlement" of the Jews which was to take place almost immediately. He referred to the pogrom in Rovno where all the Jews had been liquidated, i. e., had been shot near Kostopol.
I make the above statement in Wiesbaden, Germany, on 10 Nov-ember 1945. I swear by God that this is the absolute truth.
[Signed] HERMANN FBIEDRICH GRAEBE
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2993
I, Adolf Ott, swear, depose and state-
1. I was born on 29 December 1904 in Waidhaus, Oberpfalz. I attended school in Lindau, Bodensee, from 1910 to 1922. From 1922 until October 1934 I worked for various firms in Lindau and was also employed by the German Labor Front [Deutsche Arbeitsfront] administrative office in Lindau. In October 1935 I left this last position and became a member of the security service. From 1936 to 1945 I held various positions within the security service.
2. I became a member of the NSDAP in the year 1922 or 1923. My Party number is 2433. I became a member of the SS in the summer of the year 1931. My SS number is 13294.
3. On 15 February 1942 I was ordered to Sonderkommando 7b of Einsatzgruppe B. I became leader of this Kommando and successor to Lt. Colonel [Obersturmbannfuehrer] Rausch. My deputy was Dr. Auinger. When I left the Kommando in January 1943, I was relieved by Obersturmbannfuehrer Georg Raabe. Among other things I took part in the action "Eisbaer" [Ice bear], which was under the direction of Colonel (Army), Ruebasm. This action had the task of combating [guerrilla] bands in the Bryansk region.
4. During the time I was Kommando leader of the Kommando 7b, about 80 to 100 executions were carried out by this Kommando. I remember one execution which took place in the vicinity of Bryansk. The people to be executed were handed over to my unit by the local commandant. The corpses were temporarily buried in the snow and later buried by the army. The valuables which were collected from these people were sent to Einsatzgruppe B. This was ordered by command of Naumann the head of Einsatzgruppe B, and the same was true for other executions.
[No paragraph 5 in original document.]
6. The distribution of personnel within Sonderkommando 7b was approximately as follows :
7. In June 1942, without having received an order to do so, I opened an internment camp in Orel. In my opinion people ought not to be shot right away for comparatively small misdeeds. For this reason I put them in this internment camp, in which the people had to work. I determined the length of time that these people had to work. I determined the length of time that these people should remain in the camp on the basis of examination and investigations of the individual cases which were made by Kommando. It happened too that people were released. The highest number of inmates that I had in this camp was 120 persons.
8. It is known to me that, aside from my unit, other units carried out executions in
the vicinity of Orel and Bryansk. For example, the Secret Field Police under the
leadership of Criminal Commissar Kukafka and the Counterintelligence Group Widder carried
out frequent executions.
Nuernberg, 24 April 1947
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2620-PS
CONCERNING THE EXTERMINATION PROGRAM
I, Otto Ohlendorf, being first duly sworn, declare-
I was Chief of the Security Service (SD), Office III of the main office of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD (RSHA), from 1939 to 1945. In June 1941 I was designated by Himmler to lead one of the Einsatzgruppen, which was then being formed, to accompany the German armies in the Russian campaign. I was the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe D. Chief of the Einsatzgruppe A was Stahlecker, department chief in the Foreign Office. Chief of Einsatzgruppe B was Nebe, chief of office V (criminal police) of the main office of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. (RSHA) Chief of Einsatzgruppe C was first Rasch (or Rasche) and then Thomas. Himmler stated that an important part of our task consisted of the extermination of Jews-women, men, and children-and of Communist functionaries. I was informed of the attack on Russia about four weeks in advance.
According to an agreement with the Armed Forces Supreme Command and Army High Command, the Einsatzkommandos within the army group or the army were assigned to certain army corps and divisions. The army designated the areas in which the Einsatzkommandos had to operate. All operational directives and orders for the carrying out of executions were given through the Chief of the Security Police and the SD (RSHA) in Berlin. Regular courier service and radio communications existed between the Einsatzgruppen and the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.
The Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were led by personnel of the Gestapo, the SD or the criminal police. Additional men were detailed from the regular police and the Waffen SS. Einsatzgruppe D consisted of approximately 400 to 500 men and had about 170 vehicles at its disposal. When the German army in-
* Defendant Ohlendorf testified in Court on 8, 9, 14 and 15 October 1947 (Tr. pp.475-755) 1947
In the implementation of this extermination program, the Einsatzgruppen were subdivided into Einsatzkommandos, and the Einsatzkommandos into still smaller units, the so-called Sonderkommandos and Teilkommandos. Usually, the smaller units were led by a member of the SD, the Gestapo or the criminal police. The unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews for the purpose of resettlement. They were requested to hand over their valuables to the leaders of the unit and shortly before the execution to surrender their outer clothing. The men, women, and children were led to a place of execution which in most cases was located next to a more deeply excavated antitank ditch. Then they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by individuals in group D, but ordered that several of the men should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal responsibility. The leaders of the unit or especially designated persons, however, had to fire the last bullet against those victims which were not dead immediately. I learned from conversations with other group leaders that some of them demanded that the victims lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the nape of the neck. I did not approve of these methods.
In the spring of 1942, we received gas vehicles from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Berlin. These vehicles were made available by office II of the RSHA. The man who was responsible for the care of my Einsatzgruppe was Becker. We had received orders to use the cars for the killing of women and children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also had these gas vehicles stationed in the neighborhood of the transient camps into which the victims were brought. The victims were told that they would be resettled and had to climb into the vehicle for that purpose. When the doors were closed and the gas streamed in through the starting of the vehicle, the victims died within 10 to 16 minutes. The cars were then driven to the burial place where the corpses were taken out and buried.
I have seen the report of Stahlecker (L-180), concerning Einsatzgruppe A, in which
Stahlecker asserts that his group killed 135,000 Jews and Communists in the first four
months of the program. I know Stahlecker personally, and I am of the opinion that
Subscribed and sworn to before me this fifth day of November 1945 at Nuernberg, Germany.
[Signed] Smith W. Brookhart
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-3055
AFFIDAVIT OF HEINZ HERMANN SCHUBERT,
I, Heinz Hermann Schubert, swear, declare, and depose-
1. I was born on 2'7 August 1914 in Berlin. I attended schools in Eisenberg-Thuringia and Berlin-Lichterfelde, including the vocational school. I left school in March 1931, having received the Obersekundareife [certificate after attending equivalent to 10th year of secondary school]. From April 1931 until August 1933 I worked in a lawyer's office. From 1933 on I was civil servant at the delegation of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen to the Reich. On 10 October 1934 I became civil servant of the security service. On 1 May 1934 I was transferred by the Hitler Youth to the Party, and my membership number is 3,474,350. On 10 October 1934 I joined the SS, membership number 107,326.
2. In October 1941 I was assigned to the Einsatzgruppe D. Otto Ohlendorf was the chief of the Eineatzgruppe and Willy Seibert his deputy. I was assigned as adjutant to Ohlendorf and stayed in this position from the time of my arrival until the end of June 1942. At this time Ohlendorf as well as I was recalled to the Reich Main Security Office in Berlin.
3. In December 1941-I do not remember the exact date-1 was assigned by Ohlendorf or Seibert to supervise and inspect the shooting of about 700 to 800 people, which was to take place in the close vicinity of Simferopol. The shooting was undertaken by the special Kommando 11b, one of the formations of the Einsatzgruppe D. My task in connection with the shooting consisted of three parts-
After the execution I had to report personally to Ohlendorf that the execution had been carried out exactly according to his orders.
4. As commissioner of Ohlendorf I followed his orders. I went to the gypsy quarter of Simferopol and supervised the loading of the persons who were to be shot into a truck; I took care that the loading was completed as quickly as possible, and that there were no disturbances and unrest by the native population. Furthermore, I took care that the condemned persons were not beaten while the loading was going on. Since it was my task to supervise the whole execution, I could only stay a short time at each phase of it.
5. The place which was designated for the shooting of these Russians and Jews was several kilometers outside of Simferopol and about 500 meters off the road in an antitank ditch. Among other things I ascertained that the traffic in that region was stopped by persons designated for this and was detoured on side roads. When the condemned persons arrived at the place of execution, they were ordered to leave their money, their valuables, and papers at a place designated for this. I watched that none of the deposited items were kept by the SS and regular police who were designated for the collection. The depositing of this property by the condemned persons was finished without the use of force. I supervised this phase carefully, in order that all the valuables could be handed over to the Einsatzgruppe D for subsequent remittance to Berlin.
6. For a short time, when the people who were to be shot were already standing in their
positions in the tank ditch, I supervised the actual shooting, which was carried out in
strictest conformity with Ohlendorf's order-in a military and human manner as far as
possible. The people were shot with submachine guns and rifles. I know that it was of the
greatest importance to Ohlendorf to have the persons who were to be shot killed in the
most human and military manner possible, because otherwise-in other methods of killing-the
moral strain would have been too great for the execution squad. I have read this
statement, consisting of three pages in the
Nuernberg, Germany, the 24 February 1947.
[Signed] Heinz Hermann Schubert
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Faculty of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences