| 7. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES In one respect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces is to be distinguished from the other groups and organizations against which the prosecution seeks declaration of criminality. The Leadership Corps of the NSDAP, for example, was the instrument by which Hitlerism rose to full power in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches-large branches to be sure-of the Nazi Party. The German police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but was almost entirely a creature of the party and the SS. The Reichs Cabinet was, in essence, merely a committee or set of committees of Reichs Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. All those groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Naziism, or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to full power. That is not true of this group, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. It is common knowledge that German armed might and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many decades. The war of 1914-18, the Kaiser, and the "scrap of paper" are modern witnesses to this fact. As a result of the German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Versailles, the size and activities of the German armed forces were severely restricted. The last few years have made it abundantly apparent that these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration between the Nazis and the career leaders of the German Armed Forces-the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen. When Hitler came to power in 1933, he did not find a vacuum in the field of military affairs; he found a small Reichswehr and a body of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history. The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the Indictment-the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men. Needless to say, it is not the prosecution's position that it is a crime to be a soldier or sailor, or to serve one's country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one, and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform. It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the prosecution's position, that all members of this group were wicked men, or that they were all equally culpable. But this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported many Nazi objectives. They furnished one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany-skill and experience in the development and use of armed might. Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? The answer is simple. The answer is that they agreed with the basic objectives of Naziism, and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving those objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted Germany to aggrandize at the expense of neighboring countries, and to do so if necessary by force or threat of force. Force-armed might-was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible. As they came to power and when they had attained power, the Nazis had two alternatives: to collaborate with and expand the Reichswehr, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter. So they were the more ready to play along with the Nazis. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of. achieving much that the generals wished to achieve in the expansion of German armies and frontiers. And so the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, it was ultimately they who were taken over by the Nazis. Hitler attracted the generals to him with the glitter of conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically. As the war proceeded they became his tools. But if the leaders of the Armed Forces became the tools of Naziism, it is not to be supposed that they were unwitting, or that they did not participate fully in many of the actions which are charged as criminal. The willingness, indeed eagerness, of German officers to become partners of the Nazis will be fully developed. A. Composition and Functions of The General Staff and High Command Group. During the first World War there was an organization in the German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name persists in the public mind, but the Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff, since 1913. But there has of course been a group of men responsible for the policy and acts of the Armed Forces. The fact that these men have no collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. Men cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies not in name but in function. And the men comprised within this group do constitute a functional group, welded together by common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler, for the plans and operations of the German armed forces. (1) Structure and Organization of the German Armed Forces. When the Nazis came to power in 1933 the German Armed Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, at that time Field Marshall von Blomberg. Subordinate to von Blomberg were the chiefs of the army staff (at that time von Fritsch) , and of the naval staff, the defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatsoever. In May 1935, at the time that military conscription was introduced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshall von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch became Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The army and naval staffs were renamed "High Commands"-Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, from which are derived the initials by which they are usually known (OKH and OKM) . The German Air Force came into official and open existence at about this same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of Goering, who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in- Chief of the Air Force. In February 1938 a rather fundamental reorganization took place, both in terms of personnel and organizational structure. Although Raeder survived the reshuffle, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were both retired from their positions, and Blomberg's ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. This ministry had contained a division or department called the Wehrmachtamt or "Armed Forces Department," the function of which was to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new overall Armed Forces authority, known as the High Command of the Armed Forces-Oberkommando der Wehrmacht-usually known by the initials OKW. As the Air Force as well as the Army and the Navy was subordinated to OKW, coordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the OKW, which was in effect Hitler's personal staff for these matters. It combined staff and ministerial functions. Keitel was appointed chief of the OKW. The most important department of OKW was the operations staff, of which Jodl became the chief. Jodl's immediate subordinate was Warlimont, with the title of Deputy Chief of The Armed Forces Operations Staff from 1941. (The genesis of this department is explained in L-79.) This reorganization and establishment of OKW were embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on 4 February 1938 (1938 RGBl., Part I, page 111) : "DECREE ON THE COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES "Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from now on exercised directly by me personally. "The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its functions becomes 'The High Command of the Armed Forces' and comes directly under my command as my military staff. "The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed haber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. 'The term Oberbefehlsha-ber defies literal translation into English : literally the components of the word mean "over-command-holder," and it is perhaps best translated as Commander-in-Chief. In the case of the Army, com-manders of army groups and armies always had the status and title of Oberbefehlshaber. In the Air Force, the Commander-in-Chief of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber, al-though they were not formally so designated until 1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands, and there-fore in control of all naval operations (other than of the high seas fleet itself) in a given sector, had the status of Oberbefehlshaber. Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in question, and all but approximately a dozen of them are still alive. The entire General Staff and High Command group as defined in the Indictment comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed still to be living. These figures are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group during the seven years and three months from February 1938 to May 1945. The number of active members of the group at any one time is, of course, much smaller; it rose from about 20 at the outbreak of the war to 50 in 1944 and 1945. The structure and functioning of the German General Staff and High Command group have been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshalls and generals. A brief description of how these statements were obtained may be helpful. In the first place two American officers, selected for ability and experience in interrogating high-ranking German prisoners of war, were briefed by an Intelligence officer and a trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case. These interrogators were already well versed in military intelli-gence and were able to converse fluently in German. The officer who briefed these interrogators emphasized that their function was objectively to inquire into and to establish facts on which the prosecution wishes to be accurately and surely informed; the in-terrogators were not to regard themselves as cross-examiners. The German officers to be interrogated were selected on the basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of positions held by them during the past generation. After each interview the interrogator prepared a report. From this re-port such facts as appeared relevant to the issues now before the 'Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying these facts was prepared. This statement was then presented to the officer at a later interview. It was presented in the form of a draft and 322 5 way he thought fit. This careful and laborious, but necessary, process had as its
object the procuring of the best possible testi-mony in the form of carefully considered
statements. These affidavits fully support the prosecution's description of the group, and
conclusively establish that this group of officers was in fact the group which had the
major responsibility for planning and directing the operations of the German Armed Forces.
The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Halder (3702-PS); who held the rank of Generaloberst
(Colonel General), the equiva-lent of a four-star general in the American Army.
Halder was chief of the General Staff of OKH from September 1938 to Sep-tember 1942 and
is, accordingly, a member of the group. His state-ment reads : "Ultimate authority
and responsibility for military affairs in Germany was vested in the Head of State who
prior to 2 August 1934 was Field Marshall von Hindenburg and there-after until 1945 was
Adolf Hitler. "Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three
branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Com-mander- in-chief of the Armed Forces
(at the same time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In
practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of
high-ranking officers. These officers exercised such supervision in their official
capacity and by virtue of their training, their positions and their mutual contacts. Plans
for military operations of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group
according to the instructions of the OKW in the name of their respective Commanding
Officers and were presented by them to the Com-mander- in-chief of the Armed Forces (at
the same time Head of State). "The members of this group were charged with the
responsi-bility of preparing for military operations within' their com-petent fields and
they actually did prepare for any such opera-tions as were to be undertaken by troops in
the field. "Prior to any operation, members of this group were assem-bled and given
appropriate directions by the Head of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by
Hitler to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the Polish campaign and the
consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.
The com-323 6 effect the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces." " (S )
Halder" (3702-PS) A substantially identical statement (3703-PS) was made by
von Brauchitsch, who held the rank of Field Marshall, and who was Commander-in-Chief of
the Army from 1938 to 1941. Von Brauchitsch was also, therefore, a member of the group.
The only difference between the two statements is worth noting occurs in the last sentence
of each. Halder states that the group described in the Indictment "was in effect the
General Staff and High Com-mand of the German Armed Formes," (370% PS), whereas von
Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying "in the hands of those who filled
the positions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces." (3703-PS)
Both von Brauchitsch and Halder have stated under oath that the General Staff chart (Chart
Number 7) accurately portrays the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The
statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the prosecution's statement
that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the
major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters. Another
affidavit by Halder (3707-PS) sets forth certain less important matters of detail :
"The most important department in the OKW was the Op-erations Staff-in much the same
way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the
Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status
with Jodl, but in the planning and conduct of military affairs they and their departments
were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff. "The OKW
Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the
section of which Warli-mont was chief. It was called the 'National Defense' Section and
was primarily concerned with the development of strate-gic questions. From 1941 onwards
Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW
Operations Staff. "There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the
Great General Staff which operated in World War I. "Operational matters for the Army
and Air Force were 7 of the Army'; in the Air Force 'General Staff of the Air Force'). "Operational matters in the Navy were even in World War I not worked out by the 'Great General Staff' but by the Naval Staff ." " (Signed) Franz Halder" (3707-PS) This affidavit is primarily concerned with the functions of the General Staffs of the four Commanders of OKW, OKL, OKM, and OKH and fully supports the inclusion of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services in the indicted group, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, with his strategic planning responsibilities. An affidavit (3708-PS) by the son of Field Marshal von Brauch-itsch, who had the rank of Oberst (Colonel) in the German Air Force, and who was personal aide to Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, furnishes a few details on the Luftwaffe: "Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehls-haber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and accordingly exercised no territorial jurisdic-tion. "They were the highest troop commanders of the air force units subordinate to them and were directly under the com-mand of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. "Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation 'Befehls-haber' and from then on that of 'Oberbefehlshaber. This change of designation carried with it no change in the func-tions and responsibilities which they previously had." " (Signed) Brauchitsch" (3708-PS) (3) Functioning of the General Staff and High Command Group. In many respects, the German military leaders func-tioned in the same general manner as obtains in the military estab-lishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants at OKW, OKH, OKL, and OKM, in collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions as well as purely military con-siderations. When the decision was made, to attack Poland, for example, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would 326 8 members of the group, were present, with an assistant from the General Staff. Then there were four officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not members of the group. Present from the Field Commanders were General von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group ; General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group ; Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel, Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group. Of the Air Force officers present, General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, was a member of the group; General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other the Director General of Equip-ment and Supply. Turning to the Navy, those present were Raeder, a member of the group ; Fricke, chief of the Naval War Staff, and a member of the group ; and an assistant who was not a member, Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group, and likewise Schmundt were present. Then from the Army, Leeb, Busch, Kuechler, all members of the group as Oberbefehlshaber, and Keller, a member of the group, were present. Also Bock, Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth, Kesselring, all members of the group, were present. It will be seen that, except for a few assisting offi-cers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consul-tations were members of the group, and that in fact the partici-pants in these consultations included the members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations against the Soviet Union. B. Criminal Activities of the General Staff and High Command Group. The General Staff and High Command group is well represented among the individual defendants in this case. It must be kept in mind that this group may be declared criminal in connection with any act of which an individual defendant who is a member of the group may be convicted (Charter, Article 9). Five of the indi-vidual defendants, or one-quarter of the total number accused, are members of this group. In the order of listing in the indictments, the first is Goering. Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a member o f the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having been the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force from the time when the Air Force first came into the open, and was officially established, until about a month prior to the end of the war. During the last month of the war he was replaced in 329 9 under all counts of the Indictment. The next listed defendant who is a member of the
group is Keitel. He and the remaining three defendants who are members of the group are
all four in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all four of
them were professional soldiers or sailors. Keitel was made the chief of the High Command
of the German Armed Forces (OKW) when the OKW was first set up in 1938, and remained in
that capacity throughout the period in question. He held the rank of Field Marshall
throughout most of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of OKW, he was a member
of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four counts of the Indictment. l The
defendant Jodl was a career soldier; he was an Oberst-leutnant (Lieutenant Colonel)
when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately attained the rank of Generaloberst (Colonel
General). He became the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht, and
continued in that capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all
four counts of the Indictment. The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the
entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as 1928. He
attained the highest rank in the Ger-man Navy, Grossadmiral, and in addition to
being Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Coun-cil. He
retired from Supreme Command of the Navy in January 1943, and was replaced by Doenitz.
Raeder is charged with crimes under counts 1,2, and 3 of the Indictment. The last of these
five defendants, Doenitz, was a relatively junior officer when the Nazis came to power.
During the early years of the Nazi regime he specialized in submarine activities and was
in command of the U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose steadily in the Navy and was
chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943. Doenitz then became
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and attained the rank of Grossadmiral. When the
German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war, Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of
the German government. He is charged with crimes under counts 1, 2, and 3 of the
Indictment. Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group as a whole.
Goering is an exception: he is primarily a Nazi party politician nourishing a hobby for
aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18. But the others made soldiering or sailoring
their life work. They collaborated with and joined in the most important 10 125 odd members of the group. They are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects than some of the other members, as they rose to the highest positions in the German Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. But they are generally representa-tive of the group, and their expressed ideas and actions are fairly characteristic of those of the other group members. It is not, of course, the prosecution's position, and it is not es-sential to its case, that all 130 members of this group, (or all the members of any other organization or group named in the Indict-ment) , actually committed crimes, under Article 6 of the Charter. It is the prosecution's position that the leadership of the group and the purposes to which the group was committed by the leaders were criminal under Article 6. The individual defendants were among the leaders of the General Staff and High Command group, and, acting in the official capacities which made them members of the group, they performed and participated in acts which are criminal under Article 6 of the Charter. Other members of the group per-formed such acts. The German Armed Forces were so completely under the group's control as to make the group responsible for their activities under the last sentence of Article 6 of the Charter. (1) The Pluming and Launching of Wars of Aggression. It is, of course, the normal function of a military staff to prepare mili-tary plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily concern them-selves with the preparation of plans of attack or defense based on hypothetical contingencies. There is nothing criminal about carry-ing on such exercises or preparing such plans. That is not what these defendants and this group are charged with. This group agreed with the Nazi objective of aggrandizing Ger-many by force or threat of force. They joined knowingly and en-thusiastically in developing
German armed might for this crimi-nal purpose. They joined knowingly and willfully in
initiating and waging aggressive wars. They were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to
launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and
carrying on of the wars. These things are criminal under article 6 of the Charter.
Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on the part of all
branches of the Armed Forces and par-ticularly by the high-ranking officers who control
such forces. To the extent, therefore, that German preparations for and waging of
aggressive war are historical facts of common knowledge, or are proved, it necessarily
follows that the General Staff and High 331 11 here before you because they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war." (2) War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. It is proposed to show that members of the General Staff and High Command Group, including the five defendants who are members of the Group, ordered and directed the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Indictment. It is also proposed to show, in certain instances, the actual commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, as a result of these orders, or as a result of other orders or arrangements made by members of the General Staff and High Command Group, which controlled the German Armed Forces and bears responsi-bility for war crimes committed by them. It is not proposed, however, to make a full showing of war crimes committed by the German Armed Forces. The full presen-tation of this evidence is to be made, pursuant to agreement among the Chief Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet delegations. It will be shown that the General Staff and High Command be-came wedded to a policy of terror. In some cases, where the evi-dence of this policy is in documentary form, the activating papers which were signed by, initialed by, and circulated among the mem-bers of the Group will be presented. In other instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than members of the German Armed Forces (where, for example prisoners of war or civilians were handed over to and mistreated or murdered by the SS or SD), it will be shown that members of the Group were well aware that they were assisting in the commission of war crimes. It will be shown that many crimes committed by the SS or SD were committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General Staff and High Command, and that frequently mem-bers of the German Armed Forces acted in conjunction with the SS and SD in carrying out tasks then known by such respectable-sounding terms as "pacification," "cleansing," and "elimination of insecure elements." (a) Murder of Commandos, Paratroopers, and Members of Mili-tary Missions. This
story starts with an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942 (498-PS). The order began
with a recital that allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be outside
the scope of the Geneva Conventions, and thereafter pro-ceeded to specify the methods of
warfare which German troops should use against allied commandos, and the disposition which
361 12 "2. " 3. "4. should be made of captured commandos. This order reads as follows : For some time our enemies. have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called
commandos, who, ' as is established, are partially recruited even from freed crim-inals in
enemy countries. From captured orders it is di-vulged that they are directed not only to
shackle prison-ers, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in
which they believe that the latter as pris-oners represent a burden in the further pursuit
of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in
which the killing of prison-ers has been demanded in principle. For 'this reason it was
already announced in an adden-dum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in
the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their
accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i. e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed
down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear. I therefore order: From now
on all enemies on so-called Commando mis-sions in Europe or Africa challenged by German
troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops,
whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man.
It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for
their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when
found, should apparently be prepared to give them-selves up, no pardon is to be granted
them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW. for
publication in the Report of the Military, Forces. If individual members of such
commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the mili-tary forces by
some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be
handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW Stockades
for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short
time. 13 "6. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations) are captured in open battle or give them-selves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy sol-diers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed. "( S) Adolf Hitler" (498-PS). This order was issued by the OKW in twelve copies, and the dis-tribution included the three supreme commands and the principal field commands. (498-PS) On the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order (503-PS) for the purpose of explaining the reasons for the issuance of the basic order. In this explanation, Hitler pointed out that allied commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the destruction of rear communications, intimidation of laborers, and destruction of important war plants in occupied areas. Among other things Hitler stated in this explanation : "Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (OKW/ WFst No. 003830/ 42 Top Secret of 18 October 1942) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed. "This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands. "The' further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus. "The bureaus named in the distribution list are held respon-sible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof. "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces "By order of "Jodl" * * * * * * * "I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruc-tion of enemy sabotage troops and to declare noncompliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to announce to the competent
commanding officers and com-manders the reasons for this decree. 363 14 for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has been devel-oped in this war." * * * * * * * "The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single elec-tric power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as bloody losses of the fighting soldiers. "Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they themselves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations, since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from prisons, who can rehabili-tate themselves through these activities. "England and America will therefore always be able to find volunteers for this kind of warfare as long as they can truth-fully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. At worse, all they have to do is to successfully com-mit their attack on people, traffic installations, or other in-stallations, and upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate. "If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous dam-age through these incidents, it must be made clear to the ad-versary that all sabotage
troops will be exterminated, without exception, to the last man. "This means that
their chance of escaping with their lives is nil. Under no circumstances can it be
permitted, there-fore, that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply al-lows itself
to be captured, expecting to be treated according 15 "The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage; terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and ex-terminated to the last man. "I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordi-nated to them as well as individual commanders not only to realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or under circumstances when, there is danger in delay to be at once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of war-important weapons and ammuni-tion remains secure. "These are the reasons for the issuance of this decree. "If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot immediately after interrogation. " (signed) A. Hitler" (503-PS). Ten days later, on 28 October 1942, while Raeder was Com-mander-in-chief of the Germany Navy, the Naval War Staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of the basic order of 18 October to the lower Naval commands. The copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from the Naval War Staff (C-179) shows clearly the secrecy which surrounded the dissemination of this order: "Enclosed pleased find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihila-tion of terror and sabotage units; "This order must .not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank. "After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest sec-tion which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction. " (s) Wagner" (C-1 79). "Note for Distribution: "These instructions are not to be distributed
over and above the battalions and corresponding staffs of the other services. After
notification, those copies distributed over and above 16 On 11 February 1943, just twelve days after Doenitz had be-come Commander-in-Chief of
the German Navy, the Naval War Staff promulgated a further memorandum on this subject in
order to clear up certain misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18
October 1942 (C-178). It was stated in this subsequent memorandum that all commanders and
officers who neglected their duty in failing to instruct their units concerning the order
would run the risk of serious court martial penalties : "From the notice given by 3/
SKL [Naval War Staff] on Feb-ruary 1st 43, it has been discovered that the competent
de-partments of the General Staff of the Army, as well as those of the Air Force
Operations Staff have a wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A telephone
inquiry at 3/ SKL proved that this Naval authority was not correctly informed either. In
view of this situation, reference is made to figure 6) of the Fuehrer order of October
18,42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKI, I Ops 26 367/ 42 Top Secret of October 28, 42)
according to which all commanders and officers, who have neglected their duty in
instructing their units about the order referring to treatment of saboteurs, are
threatened with punishment by court martial. "The first Fuehrer order concerning this
matter of October 18, 42 (Appendix to Volume No. 1 SKL 1 Ops 2108/ 42 Top Secret of
October 27, 42) was given the protection of Top Secret merely because it is stated therein
: "1. That, according to the Fuehrer's views the spreading of military sabotage
organizations in the East and West may have portentous consequences for our whole conduct
of the war and "2. That the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on mili-tary
orders must be carried out even after they have sur-rendered voluntarily and asked
for pardon. "On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in battle is not
at all to be kept secret but on the contrary to be currently published in the OKW (Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces) reports. The purpose of these measures to act as a deterrent,
will not be achieved, if those taking part in enemy 'Commando Operations' would pot learn
that cer-tain death and not safe imprisonment awaits them. As the saboteurs are to be
annihilated immediately, unless their state-ments are first needed for military reasons,
it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces must receive 17 the home staff, dealing with this kind of question, must be informed of the course of action which has been ordered." (C-l 78) The Hitler order of October. 1942 was actually carried out in a number of instances. During the night of the 19-20 November 1942, a British freight glider crashed near Egersund in Norway. The glider carried a British commando unit of 17 men, of whom 3 were apparently killed in the crash. All were in English uni-form. The 14 survivors were executed in accordance with the Hitler order in the evening of 20 November 1942. The proof is contained in the following document (508-PS) : "1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a British freight glider at Hegers and in the night of No-vember 20: "a. No firing on the part of German defense. "b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed the ground. 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been carried out." * * * * * * * "On November 20, 1942 at 5: 50 an enemy plane was found 15 Km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 are severely, the others slightly wounded. "All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Furthermore following items were found : 8 knapsacks, tents, skis and radio sender, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number unknown. At present the prisoners are with the Bn. in Eger-sund." * * * * * * * "Beside the 17 member crew extensive sabotage material and work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was absolutely proved. The 280th Inf. Div. (J. D.) ordered the execution of the action according to the Fuehrer's order. The execution was carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks and serial numbers." * * * * * * * 367 18 has issued an order to the district commanders, according to which the interrogation by G-Z (Ic) and by BDS are im-portant before the execution of the Fuehrer order; in case of No. 4 of the Fuehrer order the prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS." (SOS-PS) In three specific instances the Hitler order was carried out in Norway (512-PS). The procedure was to take individual com-mandos prisoner and interrogate them to extract military intelli-gence before executing them. This procedure was in accordance with the last sentence of Hitler's supplementary order (SOS-PS), and is obviously in flat contradiction of the requirements of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The reason for this procedure is explained as follows : "TOP SECRET-According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18th October (CHEFS), individual sabo-teurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Two man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations resulted in val-uable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no clues were won; therefore, Armed Forces Commander (WB) referred to above mentioned (OA) last sentence of the Fueh-rer order (Liquidation only after short interrogation) ," (512-PS) Another instance from the Norwegian theater of war (526-PS) : On 30 March 1943, 10 Norwegian navy personnel were taken prisoner from a Norwegian cutter at Toftefjord. The 10 pris-oners were executed by the SD in accordance with the Hitler order, but the published report announced only that the unit was destroyed : "On the 30.3 1943 in Toftefjord (70" Lat.) an enemy cutter was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners. "Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Nor-wegian Navy." * * * * * * * "Purpose: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and bridges. "Assigner
of Mission in London: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe. "Fuehrer order executed by S. D.
(security service), 19 and destroyed on approaching the coast." (526-PS) Similar action took place in the Italian theater. A telegram (50% PS) from the Supreme Commander in Italy to OKW, dated '7 November 1943, shows that on 2 November 1943 three British commandos captured at Pascara, Italy, were given "special treat-ment" (Sonderbehandelt), which, as previous evidence has shown, (3040-PS) means death. What happened to the remaining nine prisoners of war who were wounded and in the hospital is not known. (509-PS) An affidavit (26lO-PS) dated 7 November 1945, by Frederick W. Roche, a Major in the Army of the United States, furnishes other evidence of the carrying out of the Hitler order. Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of an American Military Commis-sion which tried General Anton Dostler, formerly Commander of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful execution of 15 members of the United States Armed Forces. His affidavit states : "FREDERICK W. ROCHE being duly sworn deposes and. says : "I am a Major in the Army of the United States. "I was the Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of fifteen United States Army personnel who comprised the 'Ginny Mission. ' This Military Commission consisting of five officers was appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special Orders No. 269, dated 26 September 1945,-Head-quarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, APO 512. "The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October 1945 and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United States v. Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed four days and the findings and sentence were announced on the morning of 12 October 1945. The charge and specifica-tion in this case are as follows : " 'Charge : Violation of the law of war. ' " 'Specification : In that Anton Dostler, then General, com-manding military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March 1944, in the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law of war, order to be shot summarily, a group of United States Army personnel, consisting of two officers and thirteen enlisted men who had then recently been captured by forces under General Dostler, which order was carried 369 20 States identified as follows * * *'." * * * * * * * "I was present throughout
the entire proceeding. I heard all the testimony, and I am familiar with the record in
this case. The facts developed in this proceeding are as follows: On the night of 22 March
1944, two officers and thirteen en-listed men of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance
Battalion of the Army of the United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats
and landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All fifteen men were members of
the Army of the United States and were in the military service of the United States. When
they landed on the Italian coast they were all properly dressed in the field uni-form of
the United States Army and they carried no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish
a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being
used by the German Forces to supply their fight-ing forces on the Cassino and Anzio
Beachhead fronts. The entire group was captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a
patrol consisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the German Army. All
fifteen men were placed under interrogation in La Spezia and they were held in cus-tody
until the morning of 26 March 1944 when they were all executed by a firing squad. These
men were never tried nor were they brought before any court or given any hear-ing ; they
were shot by order of Anton Dostler, then General Commanding the 75th German Army Corps.
"Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified b y way of defense that he
ordered the fifteen American soldiers to be shot pursuant to the Hitler order of 18
October 1942 on commando operations, which provided that commandos were to be shot and
not-taken prisoners of war, even after they had been interrogated. He also testified
that he would have been subject to court martial proceedings if he did not obey the Hitler
order. "The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in the case of the
United States v. Anton Dostler, as these findings and sentence appear in the original
record of the trial and as they were announced in open court at Rome, Italy on 12 October
1945 : " 'FINDINGS: General Dostler, as president of this com-mission it is my
duty to inform you that the 21 members of the commission concurring in each finding of guilty, finds you of the speci-fication and of the charge : " 'GUILTY'. " 'SENTENCE : And again in closed session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of all of the members of the commission concurring, sentences you : " 'TO BE SHOT TO DEATH BY MUSKETRY'." (2610-PS) The order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as the evidence shows, until the end of the war. On 22 June 1944 in a document initialed by
Warlimont (506-PS) the OKW made it clear that the Hitler order was to be
applied even in cases where the commando operation was undertaken by only one person:
"WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the army group judge [Heeresgruppenrichter]
with the Supreme Com-mander Southwest of 20 May 44 (Br. B. Nr 68/ 44 g. K.) . The
Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy employs only one person for a task.
Therefore, it does not make any difference if several persons or a single person take part
in a commando operation. The reason for the special treatment of participants in a
commando operation is that such opera-tions do not correspond to the German concept of
usage and customs of (land) warfare." (506-PS) The allied landing in Normandy early
in June 1944, in the course of which large scale air-borne operations took place, raised
among the Germans the question as to how far the Hitler order would be applied to
Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. A memorandum (531-PS) dated
23 June 1944 and signed by Warlimont, starts by quoting a teletype from the Supreme
Command in the West inquiring what should be done about apply-ing the Hitler order to
air-borne troops and commandos : "Supreme Command West reports by teletype message
No. 1750/ 44 Top Secret of 23 June 44: "The treatment of enemy commando groups has so
far been carried out according to the order referred to. With the large-scale landing
achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order referred to directs in number 5 that enemy
soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits of normal
combat operations (large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to be treated
according to num- 22 normal combat operations, etc. ' is to be extended. "The application of number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uni-form penetrating from the outside into the occupied western areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most cor-rect and clearest solution." (531-PS) Warlimont's memorandum (531-PS) continues by reciting the position taken with reference to the request by the OKW Opera-tions Staff, of which Warlimont was the Deputy Chief: "Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff: "1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after the enemy landing in the west. "2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform, who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and including corps headquarters. "3. Furthermore, in doubtful cases enemy personnel who have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon whom it is eneumbent to determine whether the Com-mando order is to be applied or not. "4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units committed in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner with the order concerning the treatment of mem-bers of commando undertakings of 18 Oct. 42 along with the above explanation." (531-PS) On 25 June 1944 the OKW replied to this inquiry in a teletype message (551-PS) signed by Keitel and initialed by Warlimont and Jodl: "Subject: Treatment of Commando Participants. "1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage units of 18 Oct. 1942 remains fully in force. "Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fight-ing in the most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the Corps Commands, according to No. 5 of the basic order of 18 Oct. 1942, remain exempted. "2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all 372 23 "3. All troops, committed outside the combat area of Nor-mandy, are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives, issued for it. "4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily, how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This applies especially aIso to undertakings by the military commanders. The number is to be published daily in the Armed Forces Communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been done toward previous commando undertakings in the same manners." " [Initial] W [ Warlimont ] " [signature] Keitel (551-PS) . In July 1944, the question was raised within the German High Command as to whether the order of October 1942 should be applied to members of foreign military missions, with special re-gard to the British,
American, and Soviet military missions which were cooperating with allied forces in
Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document signed by Warlimont (I279-PS)
embodies the discussions which were had at that time at OKW. It discloses that the
Armed Forces Operational Staff recommended that the order should be applied to these
military missions and drew up a draft order to this effect. The order which actually
resulted from these discussions (537-PS), dated 30 July 1944 and signed by Keitel,
provides : "Re: Treatment of members of foreign 'Military Missions, ' captured
together with partisans. "In the areas of the High Command Southeast and
South-west members of foreign so-called 'Military Missions' (Anglo-American as well as
Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive
the treat-ment as speculated in the Special Orders regarding the treat-ment of captured
partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in conformity with the
Fuehrer's order are the elimination of terror and sabotage troops of 18 Octo-ber 1942
(OKW/ WFSt. 003830/ 42 g. Kdos) . "This order shall .not be transmitted to other
units of the Armed forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be
destroyed after being made record. "The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
"Keitel" (537-PS) Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of
an allied 373 24 at the camp where the executions took place, reads in part: "Concerning the American Military Mission which had landed behind the German main line of resistance in Slo-vakian or Hungarian territory in January 1945, I remember when in January 1945 it was brought to the concentration camp at Mauthausen. I suppose there were about 12 to 15 newcomers. They wore an American or Canadian uniform, of brown-green color, blouse, and cap made of cloth. Eight or ten days after their arrival the order for execution came in by radiogram or teletype. Colonel Ziereis came to me in the office and said: now Kaltenbrunner has authorized the execution. The letter was secret and had the signature : signed Kaltenbrunner. These people were then shot according to martial law and T/ Sgt [Oberscharfuehrer] Niedermeyer handed their belongings over to me,. In spring 1945, a written order based on an Army manual to destroy all files was re-ceived by the security officer in Mauthausen, 1st Lt. [Ober-sturmfuehrer] Reimer ; this order had been sent by Lt [ Unter-sturmfuehrer] Meinhardt, security officer of Section D in Oranienburg. Reimer forwarded this order personally in written form to the various sections and supervised the com-pliance with it. Among the files were also all the execution orders." (651) The foregoing documents with respect to the order of 18 Octo-ber 1942, and its subsequent enforcement and application, clearly demonstrate that members of the General Staff and High Com-mand Group, including the defendants Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, ordered and directed the commission of war crimes by members of the German Armed Forces, and that these orders were carried out in numerous instances. (b) War Crimes on the Eastern Front. The order of October 1942 with respect to the murdering of captured commandos op-erated chiefly in the Western theater of war, against British and American commando troops. This was natural since Germany occupied almost the entire Western coast of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that period land fight-ing in Western Europe was largely limited to commando opera-tions. The Mediterranean Theater likewise lent itself to this type of warfare. On the Eastern Front, where there was large-scale land fight-ing in Poland and the Soviet Union from 1941 on, the German forces were fighting amongst a hostile population and had to 374 25 partisans and other elements of the population became a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies, and a cloak for the ruthless and barbaric massacre of Jews and of numerous segments of the Slavic population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. It was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave with the utmost severity to the civilian popula-tion of the occupied territories, and to conduct its military opera-tions, particularly against partisans, so as to further these Nazi policies. It will be shown that the German Armed Forces sup-'* ported, assisted, and acted in cooperation with the SS Groups which were especially charged with antipartisan activities. Mem-bers of the General Staff and High Command Group ordered, di-rected, encouraged, and were fully aware of these criminal poli-cies and activities. It is not proposed to make a full or even partial showing of war crimes committed by the Nazis on the Eastern Front; evidence of those crimes are to be presented by the Soviet delegation. Evi-dence concerning the activities of the SS, SD, and Gestapo will be discussed only to the extent necessary to clarify the relations between these organizations and the German Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe. These policies of ruthless severity to the civilian population of the occupied Eastern territories were determined upon and made official for the German Armed Forces even before the in-vasion of the Soviet Union took place. An order by Hitler, dated 13 May 1941, and signed by Keitel as Chief of the Supreme Com-mand of the Armed Forces (C-50) provided : "Order "Concerning the exercise of martial jurisdiction and PRO-CEDURE IN THE AREA 'Barbarossa' and special military measures. "The application of martial law aims in the first place at maintaining discipline. "The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the pe-culiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve while hostilities are in progress, and until some degree of pacifica-5 tion has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless juris-diction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task. 375 26 Page Navigation Panel1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 |
Document compiled by Dr S D Stein