| Chapter Three EXPULSIONS OF ALBANIANS ( 1944-1990 )
1. Intentions and Actions of Chetniks
and Partisans to Expel and Exterminate Albanians
Serbian and Montenegrin chauvinists made use of the political changes on the eve of the
Second World War to expatriate and exterminate as many Albanians as possible. On the
occasion of secret and general mobilisation of Yugoslav military, the Albanians were not
treated as equal citizens of Yugoslavia. They behaved with the Albanians in the same way
as with the enemy. In the first days of the war many Albanian soldiers were killed by
Serbian military officers and soldiers.1
Instead of concentrating itself in protection of the borders, Yugoslav military tried
to penetrate as deep as possible into the Albanian land.2 Such planning
and actions were intended that at a convenient moment they could exterminate as many
Albanians as possible and so rarefy that population. The Yugoslav army killed, persecuted
and plundered many Albanians, especially those heading some political-national
association, such was the case with Sherif Voca, a deputy and well-known patriot, who was
killed on 13 April, 1941. Many Albanians were killed in the barracks of Mitrovica, the
post of Vushtria, in Gjakova, where soldiers burnt down the villages of Bec, Gėrgoc,
Radoniq, Janosh, etc. The wave of persecutions and physical exterminations of Albanians
involved all the regions of Kosova. It stopped only after the capitulation, namely, after
the consolidation of the Italian and German units in Kosova.
When a part of Kosova was uniting with Albania the chauvinist forces of the Serbs and
Montenegrins became disturbed. The government of Nedic, chetniks and communists, openly
and secretly, made their efforts to accomplish their plans from long time ago for the
ethnic cleansing of Kosova. The government of Nedic requested from Germans to annex the
Sanjac of Novi-Pazar, Srem, Eastern Bosnia and Kosova to Serbia.4 It
requested from Germans to send away 100,000 Albanians from the district of Mitrovica.5 It concentrated armed forced, chetnik detachments and war refugees on the
border on Kosova, directing them to the Albanian land. In this way, parallel to ethnic
cleansing and genocide exerted on the Albanians, they caused also an emigration in mass.
Chetniks committed unprecedented massacres at Albanian villages bordering on Kosova and
Sanjac, and due to this the population was forced to emigrate in mass from Kosova and
elsewhere.6
Chetniks' intentions and plans for extermination of the Albanians during the Second World
War were very numerous, and projects were prepared in this direction. One of such projects
was prepared by the lawyer from Sarajevo, Stevan Molevic, titled, Homogenous Serbia'
and was published in 1841. According to this project, which is allegedly based on the
ethnic principle, homogenous Serbia would include to the east and south-east - Serbia,
Kosova, Macedonia, and being annexed by Vidin in Rumania and Custendil in Bulgaria; to the
west - the banovinas of Vrbas, North Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Bania and a part of Slovenia;
to the south - Montenegro and Herzegovina, including Dubrovnik as well, and the last one
would be assigned a special status, and the northern part of Albania, if it would not gain
its autonomy.7 Since in a large number of the regions anticipated for
homogenous Serbia, practically greater Serbia, the Serbs did not comprise the majority
population, in some of them they were even under the minimum, but the Croats, Muslims or
Albanians constituted the absolute majority, the project envisaged the emigration of the
Croats to Croatia, and of Muslims (the Muslims of Bosnia and Sanjac, and Albanians) to
Turkey or Albania. According to Molevic, not only the regions where the Serbs were in
majority should be included in the bosom of greater Serbia, but without any exception, all
the regions where the Serbs lived, or where Stevan Molevic supposed the Serbs were living,
and to him the Macedonians and Montenegrins were considered Serbs, too.8
The plans of chetniks were based on the project of Stevan Molevic. In their official
letters of 1941 was planned: To create a large Yugoslavia and greater Serbia in it,
ethnically clean, within the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srem
and Banat. All the territories should be cleansed from the non-Serbian elements. Serbia
should border directly Montenegro and Slovenia, by cleansing Sanjac from the Muslims and
Croats.9 The same policy was followed by chetniks in 1942,
deepening even more their chauvinist hatred toward non-Serbian peoples, particularly the
Albanians.10 To accomplish their intentions they opened concentration
camps in that time, at which, besides others, 300 Albanians of the tribe of Kuē were
interned, but also of other tribes as well.11
Chetniks and other Serbian collaborators made their endeavours to accomplish the plans and
intentions for greater Serbia and its hegemony, from Salonika to Arad and from Tirana to
Split, also in 1943. Informing his Chetnik Supreme Command, Zika Mitrovic, among others,
wrote on 28 April, 1943: On your sign given, we shall depart with arms in our hands
in the final clash against all the enemies for sacred Kosova.12
The means for the accomplishment of this intention, were, thus, not hidden. To achieve
their aim, chetniks planned genocide in mass. The expulsion of the Albanians and other
non-Serbian people was not discussed at all. In an information of the Command of II
Chetnik Corpus sent to their commander, Draza Mihajlovic, in the beginning of 1944, they
wrote that they would fight to the end, as it has to do with the name of Kosovar
(...), a real war against the Turks and Albanians in general, a war without any compromise
to extermination (...).13 In the same report, the Command of the
corpus underlined that its numerical situation depended on the organisation of chetniks
based on dissemination of chauvinism against the Albanians and Turks, and such a policy
attracted even the fans' of communism. This statement was, undoubtedly, true. The
Serbian and Montenegrin communists also made use of internationalism as a means to
accomplish similar intentions. In such waters fell all the bodies of YCP (Yugoslav
Communist Party) and the Yugoslav National-Liberation Army (YNLA) in Kosova. Their
attitude in fact did not differ much from the intentions of chetniks, when Kosova was in
question. They did not make any difference between the Serbs of Kosova and colonists, who
were settled forcefully on the land of ethnic Albanians. Those bodies blamed the Albanians
of Kosova for the emigration of the Serbs and Montenegrins, that was not so overwhelming.14
This shows the hypocritical policy of communists and partisans. Both partisans and
chetniks saw the solution of the question of Kosova within Yugoslavia, namely, in greater
Serbia. Based on such attitudes, many bodies of YCL and YNLA , as well as chetniks on the
border to Kosova awaited openly the amnesty of 25 and 30 August, 1944. After this amnesty,
both chetniks, that changed their cockade for the star and Serbian partisans attacked
Kosova with their main intention to clean it from the Albanian element.
The ethnic cleansing of Kosova and other regions of ethnic Albanians occupied by
Yugoslavia became harsher in the period from October 1944 to July 1945, justifying it
allegedly as a fight against counterrevolution' and its remnants. It began in
peripheral zones, but it spread quickly in the whole regions of the Albanians. In such
organised operations several divisions with an effective of 40,000 soldiers took part.15 These military actions, apart from other forms, were led by a new
anti-Albanian project of Vasa Cubrilovic, The Problem of Minorities in New
Yugoslavia', on 3 November, 1944. In his project, Cubrilovic admits the fact that the
Serbs gained one part of the territories with alien population after the First World War,
namely, after the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom (Yugoslavia) was established in 1918,16 and they became dangerous to Yugoslavia, not because of their
counterweigh to Slavonic peoples, but because of the territories where they live and
geographical continuation that these territories have with their motherlands - i.e., due
to political and strategic reasons.17
Vasa Cubrilovic proposed before the highest leadership of YNLW and YNLA, without any
hesitation, expatriation of millions of people in mass, as, according to him, the
sole fair solution to this question is expatriation of these minorities. As his
purport and example for such an action he took the action of the Third Reich and
expulsions and colonisation of peoples in Europe. According to him, such an action would
be approved by the Yugoslav allies, after they were persuaded that minorities were to
blame for millions of Slavonic victims during the Second World War (sic!).
Based on the spirit of this project, the author suggested that they should not wait long
for the allies to agree, as it was the last chance for the accomplishment of that
intention, but the people that made decisions on the fate of our people should
be persuaded of this, and according to Cubrilovic, they were the leadership of YCP and
YNLW, headed by Josip Broz Tito.19
The author of the project foresaw and proposed its accomplishment in details. He proposed
that first the Germans should be expatriated, then the Hungarians, Albanians, Italians,
Rumunias... Although the Albanians were the first ones on the target of expatriation, this
process should not begin with them, not due to good relations between the Albanian
National-Liberation War and YNLA, but owing to the risk of a conflict between the two
countries. That is why Vasa Cubrilovic advised to act with great caution and tactics
during the expatriation of the Albanians. This would not mean that the Serbs and
Montenegrins were merciful to Albanians or that the latter ought to be saved. Whereas it
was spoken in general of the expatriation of other nationalities, the Albanians and their
territories were specified and it seemed as if the project was intended particularly to
them.20
Both the Albanians and other nationalities, in the project The Problem of Minorities
in New Yugoslavia were preferred to be forced to emigrate first from the regions
ethnically clean, and then from the mixed areas, as ethnic postblocks were more dangerous,
according to the author.21
For the accomplishment of his project, Cubrilovic anticipated the time as well, that is
undoubtedly from the arsenal of the outstanding Machiavelists, racists and
genocide-lovers. According to him, the most convenient time for efficient expulsion was
war, therefore, the best expulsion was the physical and complete extermination of the
people. According to Cubrilovic, military had the decisive role, that is why he proposed
that a special section of this question should be formed in the General Command of YNLA.
If complete physical extermination would not be successful, he anticipated additional
measures, such as: denying all the rights to them, opening concentration camps, plundering
their ownership, extermination of intelligentsia and social healthy classes, and then
urgent colonisation of these regions with Slavonic elements.22
Cubrilovic was aware at that time that funds, and trustworthy persons were needed for its
accomplishment, but also an organisation at an institutional level. That is why he
proposed formation of a special ministry, or at least, a commissariat within the Ministry
of Agriculture, as it had experience in such things since the time of the Yugoslav
Kingdom. Except for these measures, Cubrilovic proposed that national-liberation
committees should be formed from the lowest to the highest instances, and colonists should
be selected out of the best warriors, and possibly the Serbs and Montenegrins that had not
been colonists before that. The carriers of this mission, according to Cubrilovic, should
be provided with high wages, more privileged posts and high status in the society.23 The author has no doubt about the success of the project. He said that
news had come from the regions where war operations took place our people's masses
have dealt unmercifully with small national minorities who were against us in this war.
This enthusiasm of the population (that was characteristic for attacks, hatred and
revenge, editor's remark) ought to be channelled as soon as possible...24
The armed units of YNLA in Kosova and Macedonia, but also in other areas of ethnic
Albanians, acted in their operation as if they had read the project of Cubrilovic. That is
why the reply of military officials was not accidental saying that we have the order
to kill 50% of the Albanians.25 This is documented also by the
cynic reply of Macedonian commanders, when a group of Albanian patriots protested against
the arrest of 10,000 people and the punishment of 1,200 of them without any court
procedure in Tetova, saying this is nothing, it is a cleaning. This was
strengthened by the decisive order of Svetozar Vukmanovic - Tempo, Clean fast the
ones that you have to clean.26
Based on the chauvinist and extermination position of chetniks, as well as on the action
of many leaders and units of YNLA towards the Albanian population, the crimes and
massacres in Kosova and other regions of ethnic Albanians were enormous. According to
approximate evidence, above 47,300 Albanians were exterminated, in the areas of ethnic
Albanians occupied by Yugoslavia, between 1941 and 1945.27 Such
extermination, naturally, made these regions significantly vacant, and that was the
intention of Serbian chauvinists who made the Slavonic colonisation possible, opening a
new path for such a process. Except this, the exterminations and reprisals of such a
nature, that did not stop even in the years after the war, influenced greatly further
emigration of the Albanians.
2. Forms and Ways of Pressure on
Purpose of Expulsion and Assimilation
After the end of the Second World War, the Albanians of Kosova and other parts in
Yugoslavia, not only were prevented to unite with Albania, as they had declared at Bujan
Conference, but they were re-invaded and partitioned into four federal units of
Yugoslavia, in Kosova, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.28
The Serbian regime since the time of the occupation (November, 1944) and annexation of
Kosova (July, 1945), continuously implemented a policy and propaganda prepared much
earlier and based on greater Serbian projects, assimilation and physical extermination of
the Albanians. The Albanians felt the annexation of Kosova to Serbia as the negation of
their war and betrayal of the leadership of NLW to them. That is why they began to
organise themselves in illegal groups and organisations and develope political activity
and offered resistance even with arms. Due to persecutions, terror, violence and genocide
exerted on them, many Albanians, between 3000 - 4000 people,29 were
forced to flee abroad, particularly the members of political and democratic organisations
and groups with western orientation that did not accept the new slavery in Kosova. They
were directed to western countries through Greece and Italy, and there they continued
their patriotic activity. The expulsion of the Albanians from Kosova was caused by the
anti-Albanian official policy. In this way, the issue of Kosova, of its independence,
political and state status, created new dissatisfactions of the Albanians that had fought
for self-determination.
Socialist Yugoslavia and Serbia continued the war against the Albanians by putting them
into prison, arresting, isolating, persecuting, and by physical extermination and sending
them away from their hearths. The Resolution of Informative Bureau (1948) was used as a
pretext to put many Albanian intellectuals and political leaders into prison and liquidate
them, accusing them as spies of Albania. On this occasion, 436 Albanians were imprisoned,
and the pressure on them continued in other forms too, such as: closing schools in the
Albanian language, employing only the Serbs in administration, nationalisation,
colonisation, forbidding the use of their national flag, closing their cultural
institutions, etc. Another form of pressure against the Albanians was exerted on the
occasion of the census of population in 1953, changing even their national identity, and
forcing them to declare themselves as Turks.30
The expatriation of the Albanians to Turkey was perpetrated by methods of pressure. The
harshest form of pressure on purpose of expulsion of the Albanians was the action of
collecting arms during the period between 1955-56, organised by the government and
accomplished by state security organs. During this action, 22,048 personal files were
opened, including the files of the officials of state bodies. Against a large number of
the Albanians measures of persecutions and eavesdropping police treatments were carried
out. Under the pretext of searching for arms, the state security organs tortured around
30,000 Albanians. Some 100 persons died because of tortures.31
Another form of a drastic pressure exerted on the Albanians was fabrication of false court
processes, and punishment of illegal groups and organisations on political grounds. Thus,
in 1956, at the time of the action of searching for arms and expatriation of the Albanians
to Turkey, the process of Prizren' was fabricated, by which it was intended to
frighten the people through disqualification of the Albanian political leadership and
compromising of intellectuals.
Distrust and suspicion in intelligentsia were regular forms of pressure on the Albanians.
In the organs of state security the persons that bought the daily paper Rilindja'
were evidenced, which was published by the Socialist Alliance (a mass organisation formed
by the communists on power). It was the only newspaper in the Albanian language. The
Albanians were permanently treated as a distrustful element by the State Security of
Kosova. In the Handbook of UDB' (state security), all the Albaian population was
considered enemy in 1957. On this basis UDB opened above 170,000 personal files. Among
them there were four members of the Central Committee of YCL, 16 members of the Provincial
Committee of Communists, a large number of political-social personalities, starting from
secretaries of working enterprises to deputies of all the levels of assemblies.32
All this anti-Albanian action that was based on violence and terror was an
institutionalised form of the Serbian regime with the intention to force the Albanians to
expatriate and to commit their extermination.
3. The Turkish-Yugoslav
Gentlemen's Agreement in 1953
The agreement on friendship and co-operation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey,
signed in Ankara on 28 February, 1953, became known as a Balkan Treaty. The agreement
contained ten points and took a military character, but without influence and obligation,
that resulted from the North Atlantic Contract of 4 April, 1949, dealing with Turkey and
Greece. Its fourth point foresaw conclusion of new agreements and formation of the bodies
for their application and solution to economic, technical and cultural problems.33 Based on this agreement, common parliamentary groups were formed and
they visited Turkey and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia wanted to establish as closer links as
possible with Turkey in order to expatriate the Albanians from Kosova. The links should be
established by activating the Yugoslav-Turkish Convention of 1938 on the expatriation of
the Albanians to Turkey. First of all, Yugoslavia ought to fulfil some financial
obligations of the Convention that amounted to 90 million dollars. Turkey was interested
in reactivating this Convention. It was interested to use the Albanians in its war
against Curds, settling them on their border.
The question of expatriation of the Albanians was instigated by Yugoslavia through the
Turkish press. At the end of 1952, numerous talks were held on the agreement between
Yugoslavia and Turkey. Agreements on trade, floating, air traffic, and many other matters
were concluded during 1953. In this spirit of collaboration between them the
Gentleman's Agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey was signed.34
In case of a future Balkan conflict this agreement intended to secure the Turkish
friendship to Yugoslavia. On the other hand, emptying Kosova and other regions of ethnic
Albanians by means of this convention, the danger on the part of the Albanians that
requested financial compensation from Yugoslavia, as well as from the funds provided for
refugees and others that had resettled, could be reduced. Turkey had also its needs to
populate its large vacant regions. The Government of Turkey requested from the Government
of Yugoslavia, on 4 October, 1951, to fulfil the Convention of 1938. It requested that
before the accomplishment of various agreements began, Yugoslavia should fulfil its
financial obligations. Due to them, Tito invited the Turkish foreign minister, Fuad
Khprili, to visit Yugoslavia. At a lunch organised on that occasion in Split, at the end
of January 1953, an agreement on the requests of both parties was worked out, and it was
to the detriment of the Albanian population. They did not sign anything on this occasion,
and that is why it was called Gentleman's Agreement'. By this convention Tito could
accomplish the dreams of the Serbs by expatriating of the Albanians from Kosova, and
Turkey would obtain vital inhabitants and financial funds.
The obligations of expatriation of the Albanians from Yugoslavia had to be fulfilled as
soon as possible, since at the very beginning Turkey asked for expatriation of 250,000
inhabitants, out of a million inhabitants that were anticipated to be resettled. In the
official statement issued on 29 January, 1953 on the talks in Split, neither delegation
mentioned the convention and refereed to parliamentary collaboration and the question of
the Balkan Treaty.35
At the population census of Yugoslavia in 1953 many Albanians were forced to declare
themselves Turks. This self-declaration would save Yugoslavia and Turkey from public
reactions to expatriation of the Albanians to Turkey. An it happened so. Almost 260,000
Albanians declared themselves Turks.
4. Expatriation of Albanians to Turkey
(1944-1966)
At the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945, seeing that they had been
betrayed, the Albanians began to escape in mass to mountains.36 The
government bodies made use of such actions of the majority population of the Albanians in
Kosova and justified every persecution of any Albanian that opposed reoccupation by
Yugoslavia. Due to this, military courts were very busy with Albanians, and arrests,
imprisonment, killing of the Albanians became a daily phenomenon. Serbia intended to empty
these territories as soon as possible, or at least to leave as few Albanians as
possible.
One of the most efficient methods to accomplish such a policy in Kosova against the
Albanians after they had been occupied by the detachments of YNLA, and especially after
the establishment of military administration, was forceful mobilisation. In that time,
50,000 Albanians were mobilised in Kosova. When one bears in mind the number of those that
were held in prisons or in exile, thousands lost and killed, it can be seen that Kosova
had remained without the required forces to defend itself. In these circumstances, the
Yugoslav regime intended to create conditions that colonisation should take place in the
regions of ethnic Albanians. Confiscation of real estate, requisition, nationalisation and
solidarity aids' that were implemented by force and that intended to knee down the
people economically, in addition to perpertration of repression influenced the expulsion
of the Albanians from their homeland. These measures of the Yugoslav regime were directed
to the Albanians only; the Serbs and Montenegrins were saved. The opponents of the YCP
were in the most difficult position, and also those with western democratic viewpoint,
that were deported from Kosova, and their movable property and real estate was
confiscated. Their families were forced to leave the country too. As a consequence of such
an attitude, the Albanians had to emigrate to Turkey, or Albania, or elsewhere.
Recolonisation of Kosova by the Serbs and Montenegrins in the spring of 1945, as well as
the Law on the revision of agrarian reform worsened further the economic position of the
Albanians. A part of the land of Albanian farmers was given to colonists. The interest of
colonists to usurp the Albanians' land was great. Only in 1945, 10,054 families applied
for it, who could get up to 5 hectares of the land of Albanian farmers.37
Forceful collectivisation of a part of farming land in Kosova, then mistreatments and
perfidious abuse of the Albanians by the Serbs, touched deeply the national tradition and
dignity of the Albanians.
The Law on five-year plan (1947-1951) was also in the function of expulsion of the
Albanians. This plan provided more accelerated economic development for the undeveloped
republics of Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro), in order to smooth down the
existing economic differences, but it left Kosova on the side, despite its being the most
undeveloped region in Yugoslavia and its having a great economic and natural potential.
Apart from this, the largest part of the plan in Kosova was anticipated to be implemented
by voluntary' work, such as: to construct and renovate and restore houses of
colonists, to till the soil for them, to provide them with food, etc. Therefore, not only
that the regime did not invest anything, but it also worsened the lives of the people here
by such measures.38
The Yugoslav regime, parallel to violence and economic kneeling, attacked deeply the
national feelings of the Albanians, their past and historical tradition. Very few schools
and educational and cultural institutions were opened for the Albanians and the origin of
the Albanian population was denied.39
In conformity with the intentions of unitary national-chauvinist policy, State Security
perpetrated great repression in order that as many as possible Albanians should declare
themselves as members of Turkish nationality. Before this action, 1,315 inhabitants of
Turkish nationality were recorded in Kosova in the census of 1948, and 97,954 inhabitants
in Yugoslavia. However, according to the census of 1953 the number of Turks in Kosova
amounted to 34,583 and 259,535 in Yugoslavia.40 The Albanians that
opposed to this policy ended in prisons or were forced to leave the country. Thus, during
1953, as a result of this repression, 37,000 Albanians emigrated to Turkey.41
In 1953 the Yugoslav regime took care' of creating special administrative
facilities' for the Albanians wanting to emigrate to Turkey, no matter whether they
had declared themselves Turks or not. According to official evidence, 19,300 Albanians
were expatriated in 1953, and 17,500 others in 1954.42
To achieve the emigration of the Albanians to Turkey in great mass, the first condition
was to create a psychosis of unbearable life. The state machinery exerted pressure of
various forms on the Albanians, such as arrests, persecutions, inhuman tortures, physical
exterminations, etc. The organs of State Security made use of the action of searching for
arms in order to accelerate the expatriation of the Albanians to Turkey.
This punishing activity of the organs of State Security and other organs of the regime,
was expressed drastically in the field of culture and education too. The government took
measures to close down middle schools in the Albanian language, to reduce the net of
elementary schools and to close the sole scientific institution, the Institute of
Albanology in Prishtina.
Here is the table of the expatriation of the Albanians during the period 1952-1965.45
Year
|
No. of
persons |
Year
|
No. of
persons |
1952 |
37000 |
1959 |
32000 |
1953 |
17300 |
1960 |
27980 |
1954 |
17500 |
1961 |
31910 |
1955 |
51000 |
1962 |
15910 |
1956 |
54000 |
1963 |
25720 |
1957 |
57710 |
1964 |
21530 |
1958 |
41300 |
1965 |
19821 |
|
The expatriation of the Albanians to Turkey continued also in the period between
1955-1957. In this period, from Kosova and other regions of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia
emigrated 16,200 Albanians to Turkey.43
In 1958, around 41,300 Albanians were sent away to Turkey, and the year after it another
32,000. According to official evidence of Yugoslavia, 27,980 Albanians emigrated from
Kosova to Turkey in 1960.44 The expatriation of the Albanians to Turkey
amounted to 115,000 in the period between 196-1965.
The process of expatriation of the Albanians from Kosova and other regions of ethnic
Albanians was replaced by the so-called economic emigration in the political circumstances
created in Yugoslavia after the Plenum of Brione.
5. Serbian and Yugoslav Policy of
Segregation and Apartheid (1981-1989)
Dissatisfied with the position of the subjugated, the Albanian students and youth
organised demonstrations in 1981 with the main mobilising slogan - Kosova Republic. The
whole Albanian population joined the youth and students.
The Yugoslav leadership valued that the demonstrations organised by the Albanian students
and youth, as well as the slogans used in them threatened the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of Yugoslavia.46 In order that whole Yugoslavia
should fight against the right requests of the Albanian people, The Political
Platform on the action of YCL for socialist self-management, unity and brotherhood and
common life in Kosova was compiled and approved.47 This document
with greater Serbian intentions was supported by the other republics and the leadership of
the Communist League of Kosova. The Platform requested that the Albanians should break the
cultural and scientific relations with Albania, abandon their national aspirations, and
the request for the Republic of Kosova was evaluated as a reactionary one that intended to
destroy Yugoslavia and unite Kosova with Albania.48 Due to this reason,
state organs of Kosova, Serbia and Yugoslavia were requested to undertake measures for
reduction of curricula of history, literature and other social subjects taught at schools.49 To apply this Platform, the mobilisation of all political-social
organisations and state structures was requested. In this way began the isolation of
Kosova within Yugoslavia and in relation to the world too.
The first attacks were organised against the institutions of national character, such as
University of Prishtina, Institute of History, Institute of Albanology, National
University Library, then mass media, museums, secondary schools, elementary schools and
even kindergartens, cultural and professional associations and many other organisations.
The first attacks of Serbia, that took the character of segregation and apartheid, were
provoked on the shops of Albanians and individuals in Serbia in 1981. In Pozarevac, in
Serbia, an Albanian child was taken out his eyes by civilian Serbs. Many physical attacks
and ill-treatments were organised, by both Serbian individuals and state bodies,
particularly in Belgrade, Kragujevac, Pozarevac, Paracin, NiS and other cities, where
Albanians lived.50 Since that time, Serbia began to apply open
segregation, seeking only clean institutions consisting of Serbian workers alone, such as
schools, cinemas, theatres, cafJs, hotels, even kindergartens, sports fields,
swimming pools, etc. To implement the intentions for segregation and discrimination,
Serbia applied the policy of apartheid. It passed laws to rule over the Albanian majority,
depriving them of their political and citizen rights, human rights, freedom of movement,
living, jobs, juridical and social protection.
In the period of ten years (1981-1990), more than 1,100 Albanian soldiers were sentenced
to many years of prison in political fabricated processes, and 63 Albanian soldiers were
killed in the Yugoslav Army.
The Assembly of Serbia approved some changes to the Penal Law of Serbia, in 1986, by which
new delinquencies were incriminated for pursuing the Albanians, as if for the penal-legal
protection of the Serbian people in Kosova. Such actions were: violation of citizens'
equality, violation of the equal use of language and script, violations that threatened
the rights and liberties of members of other nations, and threats of security of citizens
of other nationalities, attacking the sexual freedom too. These had only one political and
legal intention - to exert persecution and repression on the Albanians.
The Serbian regime treated Albanian peaceful demonstrations, requests, political
manifestations as severe political acts, but also the cultural and scientific works of the
Albanians. In this way, 3,348 Albanians were sentenced by civilian and military courts. In
the period between 1981-1990 Serbian police and military killed 183 Albanians by fire
arms, 16 of whom were children, and 616 Albanians were wounded by fire arms, 49 of whom
were children.51 The former Yugoslav National Army (YNA) organised
killing of Albanian soldiers in Paracin and gave the action a political character so that
the Albanian soldiers could be treated as badly as possible by military and police organs
of Serbia, that had the absolute majority in YNA.
In 1981, Serbia isolated Albanian intellectuals and kept them in prison for several
months. The isolation of Albanian intellectuals took place in 1989, when the most draconic
measures of torture and repression against 254 Albanian intellectuals were taken, and they
were sent to prisons in Vranje, Leskovac, Prokuplje and Belgrade.
The police of Kosova and Serbia had worked out files for 600,000 Albanians; it means that
every third Albanian was called to the police. Further on, both in Yugoslav regions of the
Albanians and in Kosova around 100,000 Albanians were dismissed from work until 1989.52
6. The Memorandum of Serbian Academy -
a Platform on Expulsion of Albanians
Expatriation of the Albanians by force from Kosova and their ethnic land has remained
the chief intention of Serbian hegemonic policy. Parallel to state organisms, Serbian
academicians of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Serbia compiled projects on ethnic
cleansing of the Albanians' land. In 1986, the Serbian Academy, that has always been in
service of hegemonic politics of Serbian nationalists, compiled the Memorandum on the
political, economic and constitutional position of Serbia in the former Yugoslav
federation. The Memorandum did not leave aside Kosova either.53
The Memorandum is penetrated by wild hatred and falsifications of the past and present
time of the Albanians.
The Memorandum, which became the national programme of Serbia, deals with the engagement
for creation of a greater Serbia. Serbia is presented as threatened and harmed' by
the Constitution of 1974. By such constructions, mobilisation of the population for
destroying the autonomies of Kosova and Vojvodina and the establishment of Serbian
hegemony in former Yugoslavia was aimed at. The principal thesis of the Memorandum was the
allegedly degrading and inferior, unequal and discriminated position of the Serbian people
in Yugoslavia.54 Serbian academicians manipulated with the figures of
the Serbs migrated from Kosova, although according to the Serbian scientist, Cvijic, there
have never been more than 5% Serbs in Kosova.55 The structure of
population changed after 1912, after the occupation of Kosova by Serbia and its
colonisation. According to the census in 1948, there were 170,000 Serbs, or 18.9%, in
Kosova, and in 1981 there were 209,488 Serbs, or 13.2%.56 Accordingly,
there was no migration of the Serbs from Kosova, much the less, when it is known that
Serbia controlled the whole policy in Kosova.
These manipulations from the arsenal of greater Serbian politics, based on fine
fabrications, try to justify their policy of colonisation and denationalisation in Kosova,
by means of their propagandistic machinery. Serbian propagandistic machinery, attempting
to alarm the opinion, goes to its absurdity, confirming that Kosova will not have
any Serb in ten years.57 The Serbian official policy, led by the
spirit of the memorandum of the ASAS, requested the destruction of the federal system of
Yugoslavia established by the Constitution of 1974. The processes proceeding in Kosova
after 1966 made the accomplishment of independence of Kosova possible to a certain degree.
The Memorandum of Serbian academicians treated the process of the independence of Kosova
as its Albanisation.58 They requested that Kosova should be deprived of
all the rights to and possibilities for constitutional, juridical, economic and
cultural-educational self-organisation, by all possible means. This practically took place
in 1990, after the Serbian attacks against Kosova.
Notes
1. Dr Ali Hadri,
Politika Narodnog fronta i Aprilski odbrambeni rat 1941. godine na Kosovu i Metohiji,(The
Policy of National Front and April Defensive War in 1941 in Kosova and Metohia), Bulletin
of Faculty of Philosophy in Prishtina, V, p. 440.
2. Dr Ali Hadri, Lėvizja
Nacionalēlirimtare nė Kosovė 1941-1945 (Nationa-Liberation War in Kosova, 1941-1945),
Prishtina, 1971, p. 80.
3. The Archives of the Military
Historic Institute in Belgrade (further AMIB), fund of Treca armijska oblast (III Army
Zone), card No. 4, doc. No. 10.
4. Milan Borkovic, Milan Nedic,
Centar za informacije i publicitet, Zagreb, 1985, p. 229.
5. Mitrovica dhe rrethina
(Mitrovica and Its Environs), Mitrovica, 1979, p. 270.
6. The Archives of Kosova,
Archives of Provincial Committe of YCP for Kosova and Metohia in Prishtina (further AK,
APC of YCP for KM), card no. 5, reg. no. 220; Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o NOR-u
i revoluciji, I&19 (Bulletin of documents and evidence on NLW in Revolution, 1&9),
doc. no. 3; Pavle Jovicevic, Kosovo i Metohija i odluke II zasedanja AVNOJ-a (Kosova and
Metohia and Decisions of II Session of AVNOY), Sloboda, novembar, 1944.
7. Rexhep Qosja, {ėshtje
shqiptare, historia dhe politika (Albanian Question, History and Politics), Institute
of Albanology, Prishtina, 1994, p. 171.
8. Ibid.
9. Gojko Medenica, Cetnicki pokret
na Kosovu i Metohiji u vreme II svetskog rata (The Movement of Chetniks in Kosova and
Metohia during World War II), Godisnjak - Vjetari (Annual), no. X-XI, Archives of Kosova,
Prishtina, 1979, pp. 374-375.
10. The Archives of Central
Committe of the Yugoslav Communist League in Belgrade (further Archives of CC of YCL),
1942, p. 328.
11. Archives of CC of YCL, fund
of Communist Internationale, 1942, p.122.
12. Archives of CC of YCL, fund
of CC YCL, 1943, p. III.
13. The archives of Historic
Institute of Kosova, microfilms e AMIB, fund of Archives of Chetniks, C-V-17099.
14. AK, APC of YCP for KM, fund
of Regional Committees, card no. 15. reg. no. 557.
15. Dr Ali Hadri, Kėshillat
Nacionalēlirimtare nė Kosovė (National-Liberation Councils in Kosova), Prishtina, 1974,
p. 168.
16. Akademia e Shkencave e RPS
tė Shqipėrisė, Instituti i Historisė, E vėrteta mbi Kosovėn dhe shqiptarėt nė
Jugosllavi (The Truth on Kosova and the Albanians in Yugoslavia), Tirana, 1990, pp.
546-555.
17. As note 7, p. 174.
18. As note 16.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. AK, APC of YCL for KM, card
no. 10/29, doc. no. 1305.
26. Lefter Nasi, Tetė muaj nga
historia e popullsisė shqiptare nė Jugosllavi (nėntor 1944 - korrik 1945) (Eight Months
of the History of the Albanians in Yugoslavia (November 1944 - July 1945)), Akademia e
Shkencave e RPS tė Shqipėrisė, E vėrteta mbi Kosovėn dhe shqiptarėt nė Jugosllavi
(The Truth on Kosova and the Albanians in Yugoslavia), Tirana, 1990, p. 417.
27. Tahir Zajmi, Lidhja e Dytė e
Prizrenit (The Second League of Prizren), Bruxelles, 1964, p. 93.
28. Historia e Popullit Shqiptar
(History of Albanians), Tirana, 1994, p. 221.
29. Sinan Hasani, Kosovo, istine
i zablude (Kosova, Thruths and Errors), Zagreb, 1986, p. 130.
30. Historia e Popullit Shqiptar
(History of Albanians), Tirana, 1994, p. 234.
31. Ibid., p. 235.
32. Ibid.
33. Official Registar of FNRY,
no. 12. Belgrade, 1953.
34. Dr Fehmi Pushkolli,
Shpėrnguljet e shqiptarėve nė Turqi dhe Marrėveshjet jugosllave-turke (Expatriation of
Albanians to Turkey and Yugoslav-Turkish Conventions), Fjala, March, 1994.
35. Ibid.
36. Dr Izber Hoti, Format dhe
mėnyrat e pushtimit dhe tė nėnshtrimit tė Kosovės nė fund tė vitit 1944 dhe fillim
tė vitit 1945 (Forms and Ways of Invasion and Subjugation of Kosova at the End of 1944
and Beginning of 1945), Bujku, 6/II/ 1995.
37. Dr Milovan Obradovic,
Poljopriveda Kosova 1944-1953 (Agriculture of Kosova in 1945), Kosova, no. 16,
Prishtina, 1987, pp. 249-250.
38. Dr Fehmi Pushkolli, Fronti
Popullor - Lidhja Socialiste e Kosovės (1935-1975) (National Front - Social Alliance of
Kosova (1935-1975), Prishtina, 1983, pp. 154-155.
39. Dr Sulltane Kojqini - Ukaj,
Format e diskriminimit e tė gjenocidit tė politikės sė shtetit serb nė vitet e
pasluftės (Forms of Discrimination and Genocide of Serbian Regime Policy in the Post-war
Years), Shkėndija, September, 1994.
40. Ferit Shehu, Sevdije Shehu,
Pastrimet etnike tė trojeve shqiptare 1953-1957 (Ethnic Cleansing of Albanian Regions,
1953-1957), Prishtina, 1994, p. 24.
41. Albanian Newspaper in
Istanbul Besa (1950-1974).
42. Jusuf Kelmendi, Plenumi i KK
tė LKJ tė Kosovės mė 1971 (The Plenum of CC YCL of Kosova in 1971).
43. Zamir Shtylla, Shpėrngulja e
shqiptarėve nė Jugosllavi pas Luftės sė Dytė Botėrore 1950-1966, E vėrteta mbi
Kosovėn dhe shqiptarėt nė Jugosllavi (Expulsion of Albanians from Yugoslavia after
World War II, 1950-1966; The Truth on Kosova and the Albanians in Yugoslavia), Tirana,
1990, p. 442.
44. VUS, Zagreb, 7/VI/1971.
45. As note 40.
46. Ibid., p.216.
47. Platformė politike pėr
aksionin e LKJ nė zhvillimin e vetėqeverisjes socialiste, tė bashkimit e vėllazėrimit
dhe tė bashkėsisė nė Kosovė (Political Platform on the Action of YCL in the
Development of Socialist Selfmanagement, Unity and Brotherhood and Common Life in Kosova),
Belgrade, 1982, pp.5-6.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. As note 46, p.
217.
51. Mr. Xhemajl Ademaj, Ndjekja
dhe politika ndėshkrimore pėr delikte politike nė Kosovė nė periudhėn 1981-1990
(Persecutions and Punishing Policy for Political Delicts in Kosova in the Period
1981-1990), Bota e Re, Prishtina, 1995.
52. Dr Esat Stavileci, Largimi
nga puna i punėtorėve shqiptarė (Dismissal of Albanian Workers from Work), Pėrparimi,
1991, p.25.
53. Milorad Vucelic, Da li je
Memorandum srpski nacionalni program (Is Memorandum a Serbian National Programme),
Duga, June, 1989, p.6.
54. Memorandum of ASAS, Belgrade,
1986, published by Duga, June, 1989, p. 39.
55. Jovan Cvijic, Balkansko
poluostrvo (Balkan Peninsula), Belgrade 1966, p. 469.
56. Nacionalni sastav
stanovnistva po opstinama, konacni rezultati (National Structure of Population in
Communes, Final Results) , Statisticki Bilten -1295, Belgrade, 1982.
57. As notes 55, 57.
58. Ibid.
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